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ABSTRACT
We examine how much of an extra dollar of parental lifetime resources will ultimately be passed
on to adult children in the form of inter vivos transfers and bequests. We infer bequests from the
stock of wealth late in life. We use mortality rates and age specific estimates of the response of
transfers and wealth to permanent income to compute the expected present discounted values of
these responses to permanent income. Our estimates imply that parents pass on between 2 and 3
cents out of an extra dollar of expected lifetime resources in bequests and about 2 cents in transfers.
The estimates increase with parental income and are smaller for nonwhites. They imply that about
15 percent of the effect of parental income on lifetime resources of adult children is through
transfers and bequests and about 85 percent is through the intergenerational correlation in earnings,
although these estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the intergenerational earnings
correlation, taxes, and the number of children. We compare our estimates to the implications of
alternative computable benchmark models of savings behavior in order to assess the likely
importance of intended bequests for the wealth/income relationship.
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Some of the most important questions in the theory of income distribution and in public
ﬁnance hinge on the economic relationships between parents and children. Parental resources
may inﬂuence the resources of children through intergenerational transmission of human
capital. Solon’s (1999) survey of the rich literature on the intergenerational correlation in
earnings suggests that an extra dollar of permanent earnings of the parent is associated with
an increase of about .3 or .4 dollars in the child’s earnings.1 However, parental resources also
aﬀect inter vivos transfers and bequests. The marginal propensity of parents to spend on
adult children (MPS) is the key to assessing how income shocks aﬀecting particular persons or
particular cohorts are shared across generations. It is also a key to studying the incidence
of taxes and transfers across generations, with broad implications for the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy on aggregate demand, generational equity, and the design of transfer programs aimed
at particular demographic groups. In this paper we provide the ﬁrst empirical answer to
the question, “How much of an extra dollar of lifetime resources do parents pass on to their
adult children?”
Our research on inter vivos transfers builds on several studies of the responsiveness of
inter vivos gifts to parental income, holding the child’s earnings constant. These studies
generally show that the incidence and the amount of parental transfers rise with the income
o ft h ep a r e n ta n d ,m o r et e n t a t i v e l y ,f a l lw i t ht h ei n c o m eo ft h ec h i l d . 2 However, the focus
of the literature is on the response of transfers at a point in time to permanent income or
to current income controlling for permanent income. In contrast, we estimate the expected
present discounted value of the marginal propensity of parental spending out of lifetime
resources on inter vivos gifts. Doing so involves measuring lifetime resources, accounting for
the eﬀects of age of the parent on the MPS, aggregating over children, and accounting for
mortality.
In contrast to the rich recent literature on transfers, there is very little work on the eﬀects
of parental and child earnings on bequests.3 A big obstacle to research on the parental
1Less is known about the causal eﬀect of an increase in parental earnings on the child’s earnings.
2Laferrère and Wolﬀ (2002) summarize the evidence from large number of studies. Examples based on U.S.
data include Cox (1987), Dunn (1992), Cox and Rank (1992), McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997), Altonji,
Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997, 2000), and Villanueva (2002). Other relevant studies include Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993, 1994), who also study parental aid through coresidence, which we ignore here.
3Menchik (1980), Wilhelm (1996), and McGarry (1999) are part of an interesting literature that shows
that bequests in the U.S. are typically evenly divided among children and are not very responsive to the
relative incomes of children. There is also a substantial literature on the relationship between wealth and
1income–bequest relationship, at least for the U.S., is a lack of data. One needs information
on parental wealth and/or bequests as well as income of both the parents and children over
the life cycle.4 Data sets containing information about bequests received by children typically
lack information about the income of the parents and often lack panel data on the incomes
of the children. The U.S. tax records exclude cases of 0 bequests as well the vast majority
of positive bequests, which are smaller than the threshold above which a state tax return
must be ﬁled. This is why we adopt the strategy of estimating models of the age proﬁle
of bequeathable wealth as a function of permanent income of the parents and children, and
other relevant variables.5 In conjunction with estimates of mortality rates as a function of
age and parental earnings, we are then able to infer the response of the eventual bequest to
the permanent income of the parents, assuming that the entire bequest goes to the children.
As suggested by the above discussion, our empirical strategy has six steps. The ﬁrst is
to measure the permanent annual earnings of the parents and the children from panel data.
The second is to estimate the age proﬁl eo ft h er e s p o n s eo fi n t e rv i v o st r a n s f e r sa n dt h e
response of the wealth of the parents to permanent earnings. We use two complementary
data sets to measure the response of bequests to parental resources. The ﬁrst is matched
data on parents and their adult children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
age that is relevant for an assessment of whether planned bequests are an important determinant of the
relationship between income and wealth. However, this literature does not address directly the issue of how
much an extra dollar that a parent obtains at age 50, say, will ultimately be passed on to the children. There
are also a number of studies examining the role of bequests in the wealth stock, including the inﬂuential
paper by Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981). Laferrère and Wolﬀ (2002), Arrondel and Mason (2002), and
Laitner (1997) survey the theoretical and empirical literature on intergenerational and interhousehold links
and discuss the empirical evidence on t h en a t u r eo fb e q u e s t sa n dt r a n s f e r s .
4 Adams (1981) investigates the relationship between parental income and wealth but did not have
income data on the parents. Kotlikoﬀ (1981) uses information on the present value of lifetime earnings and
the expected bequest in the event of death at the time of the survey to estimate the response of bequests
to parental earnings. He shows that under certain assumptions the expected bequest at each point in the
parent’s life is equal to the sum of bequeathable wealth plus the beneﬁt from life insurance. He lacked data
on the circumstances of children. His empirical strategy is quite diﬀerent from ours, and would be worth
revisiting with more recent data. Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) exploit information in the 1984 Wave of the
PSID asking respondents if they have received an inheritance. They estimate that, among children who
report having received a bequest, a dollar increase in parental lifetime resources increases the inheritance
received by each child by 5 cents. Hurd and Smith (2002) use the sharp run-up in stock prices during
the 1990s to estimate the elasticity of bequests to wealth. They compute the ratio between the increase of
a measure of anticipated bequests and the average increase in household wealth between AHEAD waves 1
and 3. They ﬁnd an elasticity of 1.3. See also Berhman and Rosenzweig (2002) for evidence based on the
Minnesota Twins Survey.
5We chose not to pursue the alternative strategy of studying actual bequests using the sample of PSID
children because we believed that the number of children for whom both parents had died is too small. After
this paper was essentially completed we learned of the work of Laitner and Ohlsson (2001), who pursue this
approach, with some success. See the previous footnote.
2The second is the ﬁrst and second waves of the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the
Oldest Old (AHEAD) panel survey of adults. We analyze transfers using the PSID. The
third step is to estimate parental mortality rates as a function of age, permanent earnings,
and gender. We use the rates to determine the distribution of parental ages at which inter
vivos transfers and bequests occur. The fourth is to combine our estimates of the age speciﬁc
responses of inter vivos transfers to parental income with our estimates of mortality rates
to estimate the present discounted value of the inter vivos gifts to the children. Similarly,
we combine our estimates of the response of wealth at a given age to parental income with
the mortality rate estimates to infer the response of the eventual bequest to the permanent
income of the parents, assuming that the entire bequest goes to the children.6
The ﬁnal two steps involve translating the derivatives of present value of bequests and
inter vivos transfers with respect to permanent earnings into the marginal propensity to
spend on bequests and inter vivos transfers out of total lifetime resources of the parent. To
do this, we estimate a regression model relating wealth at young ages to permanent earning
and a regression model relating nonasset income at each age after 60 to permanent earnings.
We use these models to compute the derivative with respect to permanent earnings of the
expected lifetime resources of the parent (discounted to age 70) with mortality probabilities
taken into account. With these estimates we are able to translate our estimates of the
response of inter vivos transfers and the expected bequest to permanent earnings into an
estimate of the response of the expected bequest to parental lifetime resources.
We have three main ﬁndings. First, at the sample mean of permanent earnings, parents
pass on between 2 and 3 cents of every extra dollar of lifetime resources to their children
through a bequest. The estimate increases with income and decreases with the assumed
interest rate. Second, parents spend about 2 cents of an extra dollar of lifetime resources
on inter vivos transfers. The estimate is increasing in parental income. Third, when we
add together the two values, we conclude that parents spend about 4 cents out of an extra
dollar of parental resources on adult children. We estimate that the increased gifts and
bequests per child associated with a $13.82 increase in parental permanent income would
6We are implicitly assuming that there are no systematic wealth changes around the death of the last
member of the household. Hurd and Smith (1999, 2002) use AHEAD to compare the distributions of
estates of decedents to their last report of wealth. For single decedents, they ﬁnd very similar means for
both distributions. For decedents who leave a surviving spouse, they ﬁnd similar means of the estate and
household wealth when the value of the main home is excluded from the wealth measure but also ﬁnd that
part of the bequest goes directly to the children.
3be equivalent to the present value of the increased earnings associated with a $1 increase in
the child’s permanent income. Using our estimate of MPS in combination with consensus
estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income, we ﬁnd that about 85% of the link
between parental resources and the resources that the child enjoys as an adult is through
intergenerational links in human capital and about 15% is through the eﬀect of parental
resources on gifts and bequests. The latter estimate varies between 12 and 20% depending
on assumptions about the marginal income tax rate and about the degree of intergenerational
correlation in income. The corresponding estimates for nonwhites suggest a slightly smaller
role for the bequest and inter vivos channel. We also compare our estimates of the MPS on
adult children to crude estimates of the marginal propensity of spending on children under
age 18 and on college education which we construct from studies of the “cost of children”
and the eﬀect of parental education on years of college education. We ﬁnd that the MPS
through bequests and transfers is a ﬁfth of the MPS through other investments.
Our main focus is on simply measuring the MPS on inter vivos transfers and bequests,
but we also investigate whether our estimates suggest the presence of a bequest motive. The
analysis of this issue requires a theoretical model of life cycle savings behavior that incorpo-
rates both a motive for intended bequests and uncertainty about lifetimes and income. The
latter factors drive precautionary savings and unintended bequests. Since analytic models
do not deliver sharp quantitative predictions about the link between income and bequests we
use computable models to provide a sense of the magnitudes.7 One is a very simple lifecycle
model in which parents smooth consumption over their lifetimes. The results from this model
are ambiguous. The second are two versions of De Nardi’s (2002) intergenerational model
of income, savings, and wealth. In one version there is a bequest motive and in the other
there is not. Our results are broadly in keeping with evidence suggesting that the income
sensitivity of inter vivos transfers is smaller than predicted by an altruism model. However,
they also suggest that a bequest motive plays a role at the top of the income distribution.
T h ep a p e rc o n t i n u e si nS e c t i o n2 ,w h e r ew ep r o v i d eas i m p l em o d e lo ft r a n s f e r sa n d
bequests and deﬁne the parameters of interest. In section 3 we discuss the data and the
methods used to estimate permanent earnings. In section 4 we present estimates of eﬀects
of parental income and children’s income on wealth late in life. In section 5 we present
estimates of the eﬀect of an extra dollar of lifetime resources on the expected bequest and
7In contrast, the altruism model does provide very sharp predictions about intervivos transfers. See Cox
and Rank (1992) and Altonji et al (1997).
4the present discounted value of transfers. We then present the overall MPS on adult children
and explore the implications of our estimates. In section 6 we compare the estimates to the
predictions of models of savings behavior. In section 7 we summarize the paper and provide
a research agenda.
2 The Derivative of Expected Transfers and Bequests
with Respect to Permanent Income
Parental spending on children may be divided into three categories. The ﬁrst is expenditures
on food, clothing, medical care, education investments, etc. while the child is a dependent.
The second is inter vivos transfers after the child has formed his own household. The third
is a bequest to the child. We focus on transfers and bequests.
Parents form their own households at age a1 in year t(a1). At that time they receive an
initial stock of wealth W1 from their parents and other sources. They receive an exogenous,
uncertain stream of earnings yia from a1 to retirement age ar. After retirement they receive
a ﬂow of social security income, pension income, and labor earnings, which we call yr
ia.T h e
ﬂow is a stochastic function of earnings over their careers and is not subject to choice. The
ﬂow depends on the marital status of the parents and terminates when both parents are
dead.
From age a1 on, the parents choose how much to spend from income and wealth and how
much to save. We treat fertility as exogenous and defer a discussion of likely biases from
our treatment of earnings and fertility as exogenous till later. Parents maximize expected
lifetime utility, which depends on their own consumption, the utility of their children, and
perhaps directly on transfers or a bequest through a “warm glow” motive. Let xa denote
the consumption expenditure of the parents at age a. It includes child expenditures in the
years before the child leaves the home, including expenditures on education.
Let Ra denote inter vivos transfers to the child after the child has left the home. As
speciﬁed below, xa and Ra depend on W1 and (yi1,...,yia).T h e ya l s od e p e n do na, a vector
Z of observed characteristics of parents and the child, the vector Da of dummy variables
(Dma,D fa) indicating if the father and the mother are still alive (respectively) at age a and
a vector ua of unobserved characteristics that inﬂuence consumption and transfers. The
vector ua includes past, current and expected future preference shifters as well as past and
future values of variables that inﬂuence expected future income and longevity conditional on
5yi1,...,yia, and Z.
xa = x(W1,y i1,...,y ia,a,Z,D a;ua)
(1) Ra = R(W1,y i1,...,yia,a,Z,D a;ua)
Wealth evolves according to
(2) Wa =( 1+r)Wa−1 +( yia − xa − Ra),
where r is the interest rate. Consequently, wealth at age a may be expressed as
(3) Wa = Wa(W1,y i1,...yia;a,Z,Da;ua)
Because past choices of xa and Ra constrain future choices through Wa, ua includes ua−1
as a subvector. We have in mind a model that blends elements of models of parental trade-oﬀs
between consumption, investments in the human capital of children, and monetary transfers
to adult children, models of parental choice between own consumption and transfers under
uncertainty about future income or consumption needs, and modern theories of consumption
and savings that stress precautionary motives in the presence of uncertainty about income
and longevity as well the eﬀects of the timing of income and consumption.8 However,
we do not formally estimate such a model and so there is not that much to be gained from
presenting one, especially since closed form solutions for the wealth function are not available
in realistic cases.
We wish to measure how much of each additional dollar of lifetime resources parents pass
on to their adult children. The derivatives of the functions x(.), R(.) and thus Wa with
respect to yi1,...,yia capture both the direct eﬀe c to ft h e s ev a r i a b l e sa n dt h ee ﬀect that they
have through their inﬂuence on expectations of future labor earnings and retirement income.
The derivatives depend on age a in a complicated way. One will not capture the eﬀect of
an extra dollar on lifetime resources by simply estimating the relationship between Wa and
8See Becker and Tomes (1986), Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982), Mulligan (1997) and the survey
by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) on investing in children. See footnote 2 for references to the literature on
transfers, and Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of the consumption and savings literature.
6income in a given year. In principle, with complete data on W1 and the incomes of the
parents, one could estimate the relationship between Wa(W1,y i1,...yia;a,Z,Da;ua) and W1,
past, current, and future income. The estimated relationship at each age a would capture
the inﬂuence of credit constraints as well as uncertainty about future income conditional
on past income, the life span, and the future needs of children.9 However, while the PSID
provides a relatively long panel on income for most parents, the data are not rich enough to
support such estimation. Furthermore, information about income histories in the AHEAD
data is very limited.
Consequently, we abstract from the eﬀect of timing of income receipts and focus on the
eﬀect of a shift in the entire income proﬁle that is associated with a shift in permanent
component of annual earning prior to retirement, yi. yi can be accurately estimated for
most members of the sample and explains most of the variance across households in lifetime
earnings. (See note 42 below.) We estimate the regression function
(4) Wa = Wa(yi,a,Z,D a)+εa
where Wa(yi,a,Z,D a) is the conditional expectation of Wa and εa is an error term. We also
estimate the regression functions







relating initial wealth W1, and post retirement nonasset income to yi. The speciﬁcation for
yr
a allows the relationship between retirement income yr
a and yi to depend on the survival of
the husband and the wife.
With estimates of Wa(yi,a,Z,D a),y i,W 1(yi;Z),a n dyr
a(yi,D a,a) one can estimate the
response of Wa at each age to a one dollar shift in the discounted present value of lifetime
9Throughout the paper, we treat earnings as exogenous. Even with complete data, the coeﬃcient of a
regression of wealth on income will be a biased estimate of the response of wealth to an exogenous change
in parental resources if consumption preferences are correlated with income.
7resources of the parent, with survival probabilities taken into account. We discount to age
70. Let Y ∗
i equal the expected discounted value of lifetime resources conditional on yi and
Z. Y ∗















where the expectation operator ED in the last term is over the joint distribution of the sur-
vival dummies Dj conditional on yi and Z and we assume that both parents die before reach-
ing 101 years of age.10 One can estimate dWa(Y ∗
i ,Z,D a,a)/dY ∗
i as (d ˆ Wa(yi,Z,D a,a)/dyi)/(dˆ Y ∗
i /dyi)
where the “hats” denote estimates.
2.1 The Derivative of Expected Bequests and Transfers with Re-
spect to Lifetime Resources
The bequest B is equal to Wa in the year when the second parent dies. For simplicity consider
the case in which the husband and wife are the same age and suppose that conditional on
having had children the husband and wife survive to 60 with probability 1. Let Sma be the
probability that a man who is age 60 survives to age a.L e tHma be the probability that the
man dies at a conditional on survival to age a − 1.L e tSfa and Hfa be the corresponding
probabilities for the woman. Then the probability that the bequest occurs at age a is
Pba =( 1− Sfa−1) ∗ Sma−1 ∗ Hma +( 1− Sma−1) ∗ Sfa−1 ∗ Hfa+ Sfa−1 ∗ Sma−1 ∗ HmaHfa
The ﬁrst term is the probability that the wife dies prior to age a − 1 and the husband
dies at age a. The second term is the probability that the husband dies prior to age a and
t h ew i f ed i e sa ta g ea. The third term is the probability that the husband and wife both die
at age a.
Assume that Hma and Hfa are 1 at age 100. Then the expected value of the response of
the bequest to a dollar increase in yi discounted to the year in which the parent is 70 is





10When we compute dˆ Y ∗
i /dyi we assume ar is 62 for all individuals.
8The response EBY ∗ of the bequest to a dollar increase in lifetime resources, is estimated
as
(9) EBY ∗ = EByi/(dY
∗
i /dyi).
We use a similar approach to estimate the derivative of expected inter vivos transfers.










∗)[(Sma ∗ (1 − Sfa)] +
(dR(Y
∗,a,Z,0,1)/dY
∗)[(Sfa∗ (1 − Sma)]}
w h e r ew eh a v et a k e na g e4 5a st h ea g ea tw h i c ht h ep a r e n t ss t a r tg i v i n gt r a n s f e r st oa d u l t
children.
Following the strategy above, we estimate ERY ∗ as ERy/(dY ∗/dy) where ERy is the
derivative of the expected present value of transfers with respect to parental permanent
income y and is deﬁned by replacing the terms involving dR(Y ∗,a,Z,D fa,D ma)/dY ∗ in
the above equation with dR(y,a,Z,Dfa,D ma)/dy. We provide details in Section 5.4. Our
e s t i m a t eo fM P Si st h es u mo fERY ∗ and EBY ∗
3D a t a
We estimate wealth models using two diﬀerent data sets. The ﬁrst is the PSID. The second
is AHEAD. The AHEAD data are used in combination with imputations for parental and
child income based on regressions from the PSID.
3.1 The PSID Sample
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics began with an initial survey in 1968 of more than 5,000
U.S. households. The households have been surveyed annually through 1997, and again in
1999. Wealth data were collected in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999.11 We selected parent
11We use both SEO low income sample and the SRC random sample of the PSID. A substantial number
of households from the SEO low income sample of the PSID were not interviewed in 1999.
9households in which either the father or the mother in the case of two-parent households
from the 1968 base year of the PSID or the mother in the case of single parent households
reached the age of 60 between 1984 and 1999. We also include parents whose spouses died
after 1968. Fathers are deﬁned as the male head of the 1968 household, and mothers as
the female head or the WIFE/”WIFE” of the 1968 household. The children born into the
PSID sample households are interviewed separately after they form independent households.
We matched the records of the parents to the records of household heads or spouses who
were sons/daughters or stepsons/stepdaughters in the 1968 PSID sample or who were born
into PSID households between 1969 and 1974. We sometimes refer to this sample as the
“matched” PSID sample.12 If the parents have more than one child who becomes a head
or wife, we average the permanent income data across the children. We control for the
number of children who are either heads or spouses and also experiment with a control for
the variance in permanent income across children.
If the mother and father are married and respond to the 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999
surveys, then they contribute 4 wealth observations to our analysis. If the father and mother
are both PSID sample members and are divorced or separated at the time of a wealth
survey, then each contributes a wealth observation. If they divorced prior to 1984, they may
contribute up to 8 observations depending on whether both are in the sample in 1984, 1989,
1994 and 1999.13 Appendix B provides details of how the sample was selected.
3.1.1 Calculation of the permanent earnings component yi:
To account for the fact that our series on labor earnings of the head and spouse (if present)
covers only years of the survey, we use a regression procedure to adjust earnings for a
particular year for the eﬀects of age and family demographics (such as marital status and
number of children) prior to constructing an average. We use the coeﬃcients on year
dummies estimated using the PSID and aggregate time series data on labor quality and
wages for earlier years to account for the eﬀects of secular changes in the price of labor when
12In an earlier draft we experimented with an “extended PSID sample” that combined the matched PSID
sample with an additional 435 households containing older parents whose children had all left home prior
to 1968. We imputed the permanent incomes of these children,who are not PSID sample members, from a
regression based on the sample of parents for whom we have data on the children. The estimates were quite
similar to those for the matched sample.
13The number of 1968 households who contribute one wealth observation is 80, two observations is 123,
three observations is 385, four observations is 581, ﬁve observations is 13, six observations is 28, seven
observations is 13, and eight observations is 31.
10computing the permanent earnings component yi.B a s i c a l l y , yi is an average of adjusted
earnings for years between the ages of 20 and 61 that we observe. The median number of
observations per individual used to construct yi is 17 for parents and 15 for kids. The fact
that these measures are averaged from several years of data suggests that transitory income
and measurement error have only a minor eﬀect on them.14 Our results are not very sensitive
to constructing permanent income measures for each wealth observation that are based only
on yit observations collected prior to the year of the wealth measure. Details concerning the
construction of yi are in Appendix D. Below we use yki to denote yi of a kid and use ¯ yki to
denote the average of yki over kids from the same family. In most cases we suppress the p
subscript on parental permanent income yp. We also typically suppress the i subscripts.
The value of yit is identical for a man and a woman who were husband and wife in year
t. The basic assumption is that married couples pool income, and that if a divorce or death
o fas p o u s eo c c u r st h ei n ﬂuence on future wealth of the stream of earnings during the years
the individuals were married does not depend on who earned the money. The addition of
controls for number of years since death of a spouse and its interaction with the permanent
income measure to the wealth equation does not have much eﬀect on our results.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Wealth and Treatment of Outliers
Wealth includes the value of real estate (including own home), cars, trucks and motor homes,
business owned, shares of stock, or investment trusts (including IRAs), checking and savings
accounts, rights in trusts or estates, life insurance policies and pensions from previous jobs.
Debts (including home mortgages) are subtracted from the former, as well as student loans or
bills of any members of the household. Juster et al (1999) compare the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) and the PSID and ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in net worth are relatively small
until the 99th and 100th percentiles of the wealth distribution. Because we focus on income-
wealth derivatives rather than the wealth level, we doubt if this has a big eﬀect on our
results.15
14For parents, the range is 1 to 30. The 5th and 95th percentiles are 3 and 29. The corresponding numbers
for kids are 3 and 27. Eliminating cases in which 3 or fewer observations were used to estimate yi makes
little diﬀerence.
15Carroll (2000) argues that the savings behavior of the richest households cannot be explained by models
in which the only purpose of wealth accumulation is to ﬁnance future consumption. He argues that the
very richest households derive direct utility from wealth. In that case, the marginal propensity to save is
very high at the top of the wealth distribution. However, De Nardi (2002) shows that a model in which
parents have an isoelastic utility function and a bequest motive can approximate the distribution of wealth
in the US, without need of extra motives for wealth accumulation. Furthermore, we show in Section 6.2 that
11The wealth distribution is heavily skewed to the right, with several very large outliers. In
most of our analysis we exclude extreme values of the wealth distribution as follows. First,
we estimate a median regression model relating the wealth level to the level of permanent
income, a quartic in age, dummies for 1989, 1994, and 1999, and a set of demographic
variables, including race.16 We then eliminate the cases corresponding to the bottom 0.5%
and top 0.5% of the residuals from the median regression. Eliminating the outliers leads to
a dramatic reduction in the standard errors of our wealth model parameters. It also leads
to a reduction in point estimates of the eﬀect of y on wealth.
Table 1 provides variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics (mean, stand dev., mini-
mum and maximum) for the matched sample of parents and children. This sample contains
4,377 observations on 1,389 parent households from 1,281 1968 parent households. We have
matching data on 3,521 children. The number of child observations matched to a parent
observation ranges from 1 to 20, with an average of 3.48.
3.3 The Response of Lifetime Resources to Permanent Income
In appendix Tables A1 and B1 (respectively) we report regression estimates of (5) and (6.)
We use the estimate of these equations and (7) to estimate dY ∗
i /dyi assuming an interest
rate of 4%. At the sample mean, the derivative of initial wealth W1 with respect to y
is 0.14 dollars (Table A1, model 3.) After discounting to age 70 this derivative is $1.52.
The derivative of the discounted expected present value of retirement income depends on
expected mortality and is $7.28 for a white household with average income. Combining
the derivatives for Y ∗
i , earnings, and retirement income using (7) we ﬁnd that at the sample
mean dY ∗
i /dyi is $132.11. (In Table 6 and 8 below we evaluate dY ∗
i /dyi at the indicated
value for yi). Using coeﬃcients on the interaction between Nonwhite and y in Table A1 and
B1 to evaluate dW1/dy and dyra/dy and using mortality rates for nonwhites, we obtain an
estimate of dY ∗
i /dyi equal to 130.51 for nonwhites.
the derivatives of wealth with respect to income implied by De Nardi’s model increases only modestly with
income. Consequently, the downward bias in dWa/dy from undersampling the top 2% is probably small.
16We include the same set of demographics that we use in our wealth regressions. See Table 3.1
123.4 The AHEAD Sample
The PSID matched sample contains only 470 wealth observations on parents who are over
age 75.17 This hinders estimation of the eﬀect of permanent income on wealth late in
life. Consequently, we also use the ﬁr s tt w ow a v e so ft h eA H E A Dc o h o r to ft h eH e a l t h
and Retirement Study (Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan). This cohort
consists of men and women who were born prior to 1924 and their spouses, if married,
regardless of age. This group was aged 70 or older in 1993. It also includes a supplemental
sample of respondents aged 80 or over who were drawn from the Medicare Master enrollment
ﬁle. It also contains information about deceased spouses. There is only one respondent
per household, but information is collected about both the husband and wife if both are
present. In the case of sample members who are widowed or divorced/separated, information
is collected about the late spouse or about ex-spouses. We construct the parent record by
combining the information on the respondent and his or her spouse or exspouse. The details
of sample selection are in Appendix C.
The wealth measure in AHEAD includes the value of the house, other real estate,
business or farms, IRA accounts, stocks and bonds, checking and savings accounts, CDs,
transportation, other assets, the value of trusts, minus household debt. AHEAD also con-
tains information on demographic variables and health as well as some limited amount of
information on past earnings and labor market history. In addition, each respondent is asked
about his/her descendents and the spouses of their descendents and provides information on
education, family income, and labor market participation. We impute permanent income
of the parent and the children using AHEAD variables that were also collected or could be
constructed for the PSID sample. The imputations are based on regressions for permanent
income using about PSID. We relegate the details to a footnote.18
17Of the 4,377 observations used in the wealth regression, 1,060 are observations on households in which
the oldest member is between 65 and 70 years of age and 646 are observations on households in which the
oldest member is between 70 and 75. The corresponding numbers for households between 75 and 80, 80 and
85, 85 and 90 and 95 to 100 years of age are 321, 115, 32 and 2, respectively.
18AHEAD and the PSID contain a common set of variables for the parents and descendents. The common
parental variables are education of the father and mother and the occupation in the longest held job. The
common variables of descendents include family income (in 4 income brackets), age of the head of the
household,education of head and wife, labor market status of the head and wife (namely, whether they work
full time, part time or are not employed). We use these variables to impute permanent income of the parent
and mean permanent income of the descendents as follows. We regress the logarithm of permanent income
on dummies for the education of the father and the mother, occupation indicators, dummies for educational
attainment of the head and wife in the kid household, dummies for income brackets and interactions with
age and, ﬁnally, labor market status dummies and interactions with age. We also included an additional
13Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics for the wealth measure, parental and child
income measures, and key control variables used in the AHEAD wealth regressions are in
Table 2.
4 Estimates of the Wealth Response to Parental In-
come
4.1 PSID Results
We begin by estimating variants of the model




i + a4yi(ageit − 70) + a5y
2
i(ageit − 70) +
+a6yki + f(ageit − 70) + b
0Xit + eit, (10)
where i i st h es u b s c r i p tf o rap a r e n th o u s e h o l da n dt is a particular year (1984, 1989,
1994 and 1999). In most of what follows we suppress the subscripts.
The function f(.) of age − 70 is a 4th degree polynomial. The vector Xit consists of
dummies for whether the parent household corresponds to a divorced parent, father is di-
vorced and remarried, mother is divorced and remarried, father is widowed and remarried,
and mother is widowed and remarried. It also contains interactions between age − 70 and
parental income, the inverse of the number of siblings, race, the number of children who are
females and the number of children who are female heads. Throughout the paper we normal-
ize y by subtracting oﬀ the unweighted sample mean of $42,960. Consequently, even in the
cubic speciﬁcations the estimate of a1 is the derivative of wealth at age 70, W70,e v a l u a t e d
at the mean of y.
As we noted above, yk is the average of observations of yki of independent children for
whom we have data. The variable ageit is the maximum of the age of the husband or wife
when both are present or the age of the individual for persons who are widowed or divorced.19
The standard errors allow for arbitrary correlation and heteroscedasticity among the error
set of demographic variables that appear in the wealth regressions. To account for secular growth in wages,
we include a third order polynomial in birth year of the parent. The imputation regressions also include
dummies for whether we have information about the father and information the mother. Our measures of
yip and yik are constructed by evaluating the regressions using the data for the members of the AHEAD
sample. The sample size and the adjusted R2 of the model for yip are 16,200 and 0.42. The corresponding
values of the model for yik are 16,742 and 0.50.
19We obtain very similar results using the minimum of the ages of the husband and wife.
14terms for observations on parents from the same 1968 household. They do not account for
the fact that y and yk are estimated.
The results are in Table 3.1. Model I excludes the quadratic and cubic terms in y.
The coeﬃcient (standard error) on y is 5.24 (0.43). This says that a one dollar increase in
permanent earnings (earnings per year) leads to a 5.24 dollar increase in wealth at age 70.
The interaction term a3 is small and positive: 0.02 (.036). The derivative with respect to y
is 5.04 (0.50) at age 60, 5.44 (0.61) at age 80, and 5.54 (0.75) at age 85. Dividing the 5.24
ﬁgure by the estimate 132.11 for dY ∗/dy yields .0397 as the eﬀe c to fao n ed o l l a ri n c r e a s ei n
Y ∗ on wealth at age 70 at the mean of Y ∗.
In Model IV in Table 3.1, we add interactions between y and dummies for widowed par-
ent and for divorced/separated parent (all models include widowed and divorced/separated
dummies). At the sample mean dW70/dy is 5.62 (.57), which implies a .0425 as the estimate
of dW70/dY ∗. Divorce status also has a substantial negative, precisely estimated eﬀect on
the income derivative. The sensitivity of wealth to permanent income is much lower for
widows. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is -2.44 (0.72), and the average derivative
at age 70 for widows is 3.18 (evaluated at the sample mean of income). One explanation is
that part of the bequest occurs when the ﬁrst parent dies, although we doubt if this is the
whole story. It is also possible that the death of a spouse alters the relationship between
our measure of permanent income and the present discounted value of lifetime resources.20
We have estimated a speciﬁcation in which we include the product of income, a dummy
for whether the parent is a widow/er and the number of years since the surviving parent
became a widow/er in the model, along with the number of years since the parent became a
widow/er. The coeﬃcient of the interaction between income and the dummy for a widowed
parent is -2.07 in the new speciﬁcation.
4.1.1 Results for Nonwhites
A striking fact about the wealth distribution in the United States is that on a per household
basis African American households possess only about 1/5 of the wealth of white house-
20Zick and Smith (1991) document that older widows and widowers have lower income-needs ratios than
comparable intact couples. Using an event history analysis, they decompose the diﬀerences in income-needs
ratios into diﬀerences prior to the death and diﬀerences after the death. They ﬁnd that most of the diﬀerences
in living standards already exists 5 years prior to death. They also ﬁnd a fall in income from dividends,
rents and interest in the year of the death of one of the spouses, which is consistent with an early bequest
happening after the death of the ﬁrst spouse.
15holds.21 The race gap in wealth is much larger than the corresponding gap in income. In
Table 3.1, Model V, we have estimated models in which we interact y with a race indica-
tor that equals 1 for nonwhites. (91 % of the nonwhites in the PSID matched sample are
African-American.)22 The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is -2.20 (0.69), and the point
estimate of dW70/dy at the mean of income for the full sample is 3.89. When the interaction
between y and widowed is taken into account, the estimates imply that dW70/dy is only 1.60
for non-white widows and widowers. (The model assumes that the quadratic and cubic term
and the age interactions are the same for whites and nonwhites.) The large race diﬀerence in
the income sensitivity of wealth is consistent with the ﬁndings of other studies that compare
the wealth functions of whites and blacks for broad age groups.
4.2 AHEAD Results
In Table 3.2 we report estimates of variants of (3.1) using the AHEAD sample. We report
robust panel standard errors but do not correct them for the fact that permanent income is
imputed. They are probably understated. For the linear speciﬁcation we obtain a coeﬃcient
of 6.72 (0.63) on y and a coeﬃcient of -0.11 (0.05) on y(age − 70).I nc o l u m n2w ea d dy2
and y2 ∗ (age − 70). We subtract the PSID sample mean from y prior to estimation, and
so the coeﬃcient on the linear term (5.27) is dW70/dy at the PSID mean. This estimate
is somewhat above the value of 4.29 we obtained using the PSID sample. The quadratic
term in wealth is similar to that in the PSID. The interaction terms show a modest decline
in the income derivative with age. The Model I estimates imply that at the mean of y the
derivative declines by 1.1 over 10 years.
In keeping with the PSID results, the income derivative is substantially lower for widows.
Being divorced or separated reduces the derivative by -1.87 (1.79) in the AHEAD sample.
This is smaller than the value of -2.25 (.87) in the PSID sample, but the AHEAD estimate
is not very precise.23 Overall, however, the PSID and AHEAD results are remarkably close
given sampling error and the fact that we had to impute y and yk for the AHEAD sample.
21See for example, Blau and Graham (1990), Avery and Rendall (1997), Menchik (1980), Altonji et al
(2000), and Barsky et al (2002). Scholz and Levine (2002) provide a recent literature survey.
22The race indicator is included as a separate control in all of the models in the table. The estimates of
permanent income reﬂect race diﬀerences in the distribution of income.
23Note that the regression used to impute y for AHEAD respondents contains a dummy variable for widow,
a dummy for widower, and another one for divorced.
165 Estimates of the Response of Expected Bequests and
Transfers to Permanent Income and Lifetime Re-
sources
5.1 The Response of Expected Bequests to Permanent Income.
We now use equation (8) and estimates of dWa/dy from Table 3.1, Model V to calculate EBy,
the derivative of expected bequests with respect to permanent income. The calculations are
for a husband and wife who are the same age and survive to age 60.24 We use data from
t h eU . S .l i f et a b l e sf o r1 9 9 8t oc o n s t r u c tr a c es p e c i ﬁc estimates of Sfa, Hfa, Sma,a n dHma
and adjust them by y.25 We assume that Hma and Hfa a r e1a ta g e1 0 0 . W ec o m p u t e
dWa/dy by setting the age term in the interactions that appear in Model V to the age of the
surviving spouse in the year of his or her death. (In our example, both husband and wife
are the same age.) If both spouses die in the same year we set widowed ∗ y to 0. Panel A
in Table 4 displays values of Sfa,S ma,H ma,H fa,P ba, and dWa/dy for whites. The values of
dWa/dy are evaluated at the mean y of the combined sample of whites and nonwhites.26 As
one can see in the last two columns of the table, dWa/dy increases slowly with age. EByiis
the sum of the derivatives dWa/dy for each value of a weighted by the probability that the
second parent dies at age a. We use an interest rate of 4% to discount the bequests to when
t h ep a r e n t sa r e7 0y e a r so l d . I nT a b l e4p a n e lB ,w er e p o r tt h a tEBy is 1.68, 2.56, and
3.10 dollars respectively at the 10th percentile, sample mean, and 90th percentile value of
income.27
24Our estimates of the derivative of expected bequests are not sensitive to a variety of alternative functional
forms for the terms involving y, the interaction between y and age-70, and the interaction between y and
widowed, including the cubic interactions between y and the linear age term and a quadratic interaction
between y and widow status, and the use of a spline with diﬀerent slopes for each quintile of the income
distribution.
25We adjusted the probability of death at a given age by permanent income as follows. First, we use a
sample of all PSID members above 50 years of age to run logit regressions of the event of death on the
following regressors: permanent income of the head of the household, the mortality probability for race and
gender estimates contained the U.S. life tables for1998 and race and gender intercepts. We then treat the
U.S. lifetable values as the path for the median person alive at each point in time. Up to age 80, for a given
income level we adjust the mortality rate by multiply i n gt h eU . Sl i f et a b l ev a l u eb yt h er a t i oo ft h eP S I D
prediction for the given income level to the PSID prediction for the median income level. After age 80, we
use the U.S. life table value for all persons, and do not adjust for income. We stop at age 80 because the
PSID sample is relatively young, and does not contain enough observations on individuals above 80 to be
able to forecast their mortality.
26These values use the household weights for 1989.
27As a robustness check we have also estimated a model of the conditional median of wealth corresponding
to the speciﬁcation in Table 3.1, Model V. Using the conditional median estimates in place of the mean
regression parameters we obtain we obtain estimates of EBy of 1.08 (0.10), 2.17 (0.08) , and 3.10 (0.09) at
17When we use the AHEAD parameter values in Table 3.2, Model IV, the estimates of EBy
at the 10th percentile, sample mean, and 90th percentile values of y are 3.24 (1.16) , 3.72
(1.12) , and 4.01 (1.05) respectively in the case of whites. For nonwhites the PSID based
estimates of EBy are 0.21, 1.46, and 2.12 at the 10th percentile, mean, and 90th percentile of
the income distribution for the combined sample. (Table 5 panel B). The AHEAD estimates
for nonwhites are 2.40 (.80), 3.19 (1.07) and 3.67 (1.19).
5.2 The Response of Expected Bequests to Lifetime Resources
In row 1, column 2 of Table 6 we report that at the sample mean, EBy/(dY ∗
i /dyi) is 0.019
(0.003). (The estimate is obtained by dividing the corresponding estimates of EBy in Table
4, Panel B by $132.11.) That is, at the sample mean two cents of every dollar of lifetime
resources is passed on to the children through bequests. The estimates at the 10th percentile
a n d9 0 t hp e r c e n t i l e so fyi are equal to 0.013 (0.006) and 0.023 (0.005) in the case of the PSID.
Row 2 of the table values based on AHEAD at the 10th percentile, sample mean, and 90th
percentile. These are 0.024 (0.008), 0.028 (0.008) and 0.03 (0.008). For both samples, the
estimates are lower for nonwhites (rows 3 and 4).
The previous estimates assume that the bequest happens after the death of the last mem-
ber of the couple. Nevertheless, there may exist an early bequest after the death of the ﬁrst
parent. To explore this possibility, we make the alternative, probably extreme assumption
t h a tt h ee n t i r ed i ﬀerence in the wealth-income derivative between intact couples and widows
is the derivative of an early bequest with respect to income. We added it (after appro-
priate discounting) to our previous estimate that was based on the entire bequest occuring
after the death of the second spouse. Compared to the estimates in the ﬁrst row of Table
6 the derivative of expected bequests with respect to lifetime resources increases by about
1.3 cents, becoming .026 (.006), .033 (.005) and .037 (.006) at the 10th, average and 90th
percentiles of the income distribution. However, this is almost certainly an overestimate.
the 10th percentile, mean and 90th percentile of the income distribution. (Standard errors ignore serial
correlation due to the panel structure of the data.) Because of randomness in lifespan these estimates cannot
be interpreted as the derivatives of the conditional median of bequests.
185.3 The Response of Expected Inter vivos Transfers to Permanent
Income and Lifetime Resources
In this subsection, we present estimates of the impact of parental permanent income on inter
v i v o st r a n s f e r s . W eu s et h e1 9 8 8T r a n s f e rS u p p l e m e n tF i l eo ft h eP S I Dt oe s t i m a t eERy.
We use a matched sample of parents and children that is similar to that described in Altonji
et al. (1997). For each parental household, we aggregate the inter vivos transfers given to
all children. The summary statistics for this sample are presented in Appendix Table C1.
Thirty-three percent of parents gave a transfer to at least one of their adult children in 1987.
The conditional mean of R, R(y,a,Z,Dfa,D ma),i se q u a lt o
P(R>0|y,a,Z,Dfa,D ma)E(R|R>0,y,a,Z,D fa,D ma).
We estimate
dR(y,a,Z,Dfa,Dma)
dy using three alternative methods. We focus the discussion
around the results of our preferred approach, which is to estimate P(R>0|y,a,Z,Dfa,D ma)
using a probit model and E(R|R>0,y,a,Z,D fa,D ma) by OLS regression for R on the sub-
sample of parents who give transfers. The second method is to estimate R(y,a,Z,Dfa,D ma)
by OLS on the full transfer sample, with 0 transfers included. The third method uses a To-
bit model on the full sample. We recover
dR(y,a,Z,Dfa,Dma)
dy using the properties of the normal
distribution (see McDonald and Moﬃt (1980)). The estimates are in Table 7.
The ﬁrst column of Table 7 shows the results from an OLS estimation of the regression
of inter vivos transfers on a fourth order polynomial in y and demographic variables, with
0 transfer observations included. y is the deviation from the sample mean and age is the
deviation from age 70, so the coeﬃcient .056 (.014) on the linear term is the derivative with
respect to income of inter vivos transfers to all children evaluated at the average level of
income for a parent who is aged 70. The response is increasing over most of the range of the
income distribution.
Next, we use the estimates from Table 7 to estimate ERy∗. We obtain these by ﬁrst
computing the expected discounted value of the response of lifetime inter vivos transfers to
permanent income and dividing by dY ∗/dy. The calculations are for a husband and wife
who are the same age and survive to at least age 60. We use an interest rate of 4% and the
mortality rates after age 60 are the ones we use in the previous subsection (see footnote 25).
In Table 8, we produce estimates of ERY ∗ by dividing the estimates of ERy by dY ∗/dy
(132.11 for a white person with average income). The estimates in the ﬁrst row in Table 8
19indicate that at the mean and the 90th percentile of income, ERY ∗ is 2.3 cents and 2.2 cents
respectively. The corresponding estimate based on probit-OLS approach in row two are 1.24
cents and 1.9 cents.
5.4 Implications of the Estimates for Intergenerational Sharing of
Resources
To obtain MPS for whites, we sum the PSID estimates of EBY ∗ and ERY ∗ reported in the
ﬁrst row of Table 6 and second row of Table 8, respectively. MPS is 0.013 (=0.013-0.0002)
at the 10th percentile of the income distribution. At the average income level, MPS is 0.031
(=0.019+0.012). Even at the 90th percentile, MPS is only 0.042 (=0.023+0.019). The cor-
responding estimates for nonwhites are 0.002, 0.019 and 0.03 evaluated at the 10th, average
and 90th percentile of the combined income distribution. Using the AHEAD estimates of
EBy we obtain slightly bigger numbers. From these results, we conclude that at most, a
small fraction of an extra dollar of lifetime resources is passed on to children as bequests and
inter vivos transfers.
From the child’s point of view, what are the terms of trade between another dollar of y for
the parent and another dollar of yk f o rt h ec h i l d ?I ne a c ho ft h er o w so fT a b l e9w ep r o v i d e
the details of alternative calculations of this number. In all cases we assume that the child is
25 years younger than the parent, and, without loss of generality, compute the terms of trade
when the child is 25 years of age. The results in the ﬁrst row of Table 4 Panel B imply that,
at the mean of y, an extra dollar of y increases the expected bequest by $2.56 (discounted
to when the parent is 70 and the child is 45). Next, we assume perfect credit markets and
an interest rate of 4%. From the child’s point view receiving 2.56 extra dollars when he is
45 and the parent is 70 is equivalent to receiving $1.17 (=$2.56/(1+0.04)20)a t2 5( T a b l e9 ,
row 1A, col 7a -whites). The corresponding estimate for inter vivos transfers implies that an
extra dollar of y increases the expected value of inter vivos transfers discounted to when the
parent is 70 by $1.65. From the point of view of the child, receiving $1.65 when the parent
is 70, is equivalent to receiving $0.75 (=1.65/(1+0.04)20) when the child is 25 (row 1A, col
8a -whites). The sum of the bequest and the transfers is $1.92.28 On the other hand, an
extra dollar of yk increases the lifetime resources of the child by $22.62.29 The ratio between
28These estimates ignore the eﬀect of permanent income of the parent on the initial wealth of the child.
We have expanded equation 5 to include permanent income of the parent. The coeﬃcient of parental income
on initial wealth of the child, although imprecisely estimated, is not statistically diﬀerent from 0.
29The number 22.62 is obtained by calculating the eﬀect of an extra dollar of permanent income on initial
20$1.92 and $22.62 is 0.085. In other words, the lifetime resources of the child increase by the
same amount if own permanent income increases by a dollar or if the permanent income of
the parent increases by $11.77 (row 1a col 9a -whites.)
The number is larger if we take into account the fact that the average parent in our
sample has 3 children, and that bequests and gifts are shared among all the children. A
crude adjustment is simply to divide the 0.085 ﬁgure by 3, which is 0.028, and multiply
the $11.77 ﬁgure by 3, which is $35.31 (Table 9 row 2a, col 9 -whites). A better way is
to re-estimate the wealth model allowing dWa/dy to depend on the number of children by
adding the interaction between number of children and y to the wealth model and to estimate
dRa/dy directly on a per child basis by using the transfer data on individual children with the
interaction between y and number of children included. Using this procedure, we ﬁnd that
for a parent with 3 children the eﬀect of a $1 increase in y on the expected bequest and the
expected transfer are 0.79 and 0.39 respectively (row 1b -whites). The increase in y required
to compensate the child for a $1 decrease in yk is $18.92. If we take into account the fact
that child’s earnings are pre tax while bequests and transfers are largely post tax, and apply
a tax rate of .27 to earnings, the estimated trade-oﬀ is $13.81 (row 2b, col 9 -whites). For
an only child the value is $10.68 (row 4b, col. 9 -whites). These calculations suggest that,
from the perspective of the child, the impact of an extra dollar of parental resources on own
resources through gifts and bequests is small. These results are qualitatively consistent with
but smaller than Altonji et al’s (1992) estimate that the impact of the income of members
of the extended family on the consumption level of a household is about 1/5th as large as
the impact of own income on consumption. Note, however, that Altonji et al’s estimate does
not isolate the impact of the parents alone and should be revisited in future work.
It is also interesting to compare the link between parental resources and the child’s
resources that operates through transfers and bequests to the link between the permanent
income of the parent to the permanent income of the child. Solon’s (1999) survey suggests
that 0.4 is a reasonable estimate of the link between y and yk. Consequently, 0.4 times the
present value to the child at age 25 of a 1 dollar increase in yk is an estimate of the value
to the child of a 1 dollar increase in y holding bequests and inter vivos transfers constant.
This ﬁgure is 0.4×22.62 or $9.05. It may be compared to $1.92, the present discounted value
of the increase in bequests and transfers associated with a 1 dollar increase in y.T h a t i s ,
wealth, the life-cycle stream of earnings and post-retirement income. That number is 132.11 for a white
couple at age 70. The value $132.11 at the age of 70 is equivalent to $22.62= 132.11
(1.04)45 at the age of 25.
21about 9.05/(1.92+9.05) or .82 of the eﬀect of an increase in y on the child’s adult resources
operates through the link between y and yk. This means that .18 of the eﬀect is through
bequests and transfers, which is not negligible. (Table 9, row 1a, col 10 -whites). The
estimated fraction through bequests and transfers is .07 if we adjust for the average number
of children by simply dividing the eﬀect of y on bequests and transfers by 3. (col 10, row 2a
-whites). Using the procedure in panel B to estimate bequests and transfers on a per child
basis, the estimate is .12 (col 10, row 1b -whites). Taking account of taxes raises the value
to .15. The estimate rises to .20 if we use the value .28 that we obtain from a regression
of yk on yp and controls for a cubic in the birth year of the child in our sample instead of
.4. Finally, if we use .28 as the link between yk and yp,a p p l yat a xr a t eo f. 2 7t ot h ec h i l d ’ s
earnings, and evaluate the wealth and transfer models for an only child, we obtain .25 as the
fraction of the eﬀect of y on child’s resources that operates through transfers and bequests.
This is quite substantial.
At the average income level, our preferred estimates for whites suggest that the response
of bequest and gifts accounts for about 15% of the eﬀect of parental resources on the resources
of a child as an adult. The estimate varies between 12 and 20% depending on assumptions
about the marginal tax rate and the degree of intergenerational correlation in income. The
corresponding estimates for nonwhites suggest a slightly smaller role for the bequest and
inter vivos channel
5.4.1 Comparison to the marginal propensity to spend on children under 18
and on college
To provide further perspective on the results for spending on adult children, we have used
two sources of information to construct estimates of the marginal propensity to spend on
young children and on college expenses. Espenshade (1984) reports the total expenses
on children between ages 0-17 for three income groups as a function of the wife’s labor
f o r c es t a t u s .F o re a c hl a b o rf o r c es t a t e ,w ec o m p u t ed(Spending0_17)/dy as the ratio of the
diﬀerences in expenditures between income groups and the diﬀerences in the value of income
(at age 40 conditional on education and occupation). We then take a weighted average
across labor force states. We obtain 2.04 as d(Spending0_17)/dy based on the comparison
of medium and high SES households and 2.52 as the value based on the comparison of low
and medium SES households.30 We use the simple average of these numbers, 2.28, as the
30See Table 4 in Espenshade (1984)
22estimate of d(Spending0_17)/dy for a family at mean income. Assuming three children and
Espenshade’s estimate of 0.77 for economies of scale, we ﬁnd that the derivative of expenses
with respect to parental income at age 40 is 2.28*3*0.77=5.26. To take these numbers to
age 70 of the parent, we assume that the parents have the children when the father is 25,
27, and 29 and use age 27 as the midpoint. Assuming an interest rate of 4%, 5.26 dollars
at age 27 is equivalent to 28.43 dollars at age 70. Using our estimate of 132.11 for dY ∗/dy,
d(Spending0_17)/dy∗ is 28.43/132.11=.215. That is, parents spend .215 of an extra dollar
of lifetime resources on young children, which is about 5 times as large as our estimate
of MPS through transfers and bequests to adult children. We obtain a value of .16 for
d(Spending0_17)/dy∗ when we use estimated costs of raising a child, net of college costs from
the US. Dept. of Agriculture (Lino (2002)) which are based on a diﬀerent methodology
than Espenshade’s. 31
What about college expenses? Cameron and Heckman (2001) report estimates of the
marginal eﬀect of parental income on the probability of attending a two-year college, a four-
year public college, and a four-year private college.32 The estimated eﬀects are small. Using
estimates of tuition, assuming parents pay all of tuition and children pay living expenditures
through loans or earnings, Cameron and Heckman’s (2001) estimates imply that the marginal
propensity to spend on college tuition out of a dollar of lifetime resources is less than 0.004
per child in age 70 dollars. We obtain a similar result using Hauser’s (1993) estimates of
the eﬀect of parental income on college attendance probabilities.
31Espenshade uses the share of family income devoted to food consumption as a measure of welfare.
His strategy to identify the cost of raising a child is the following. He uses a sample from the Survey
of Consumer Expenditures to run regressions of the share of food consumption in total family income on
income and demographics. The (age-speciﬁc) cost of rising a child is obtained by calculating the income
diﬀerence between a two-person family and a three-person family who have the same predicted share of food
consumption. Lino (2002) uses a diﬀerent strategy. He regresses shares of consumption on family composition
dummies and income measures. For each family-type and income group, he predicts consumption of each
item and assigns the cost to each person in the household on a per-capita basis.
32Espenshade also reports estimates of college expenditures by income level, but he simply assumes prob-
abilities of attendance by type of school rather than using direct data on college expenditures or estimating
the eﬀect of parental income on college attendance. Consequently, we do not use his college expenditure
numbers.
236 Implications of the Wealth Functions for the Ad-
equacy of Savings and the Existence of a Bequest
Motive
To put the magnitude of the estimate of the bequest response to income in theoretical
perspective, we use a computable structural intergenerational model of wealth and income
developed by De Nardi (2002) to simulate data on Wa,W 1,y i1,...y ia,a n dZi under alternative
assumptions about the degree of parental altruism. We use the simulated data to estimate
dW(yi,Z,a)/dyi and compare the results to estimates based upon the PSID.33,34
33We do not attempt to compare estimates of dW(Y ∗,Z,a)/dY ∗ from the simulated data to estimates
from the PSID given the discrepancy between the assumptions about post-retirement income and initial
wealth assumptions built into De Nardi’s model and our PSID based estimates of the link between y and
these two components of Y ∗.
34We have also examined our estimates using a simple certainty equivalence model. The model assumes
no bequest motive, perfect credit markets, no uncertainty about income or life span (although life spans vary
across people), and that parents strongly prefer a smooth consumption path but do not have access to an
annuities market. Assume in addition that that parents work from age 20 to age 62, both survive till at least
age 70, and that the after-tax real interest rate is 4%. In this case, our estimates of the wealth model and the
retirement income models imply that .05 out of each extra dollar of lifetime resources (discounted to age 70)
is available for consumption in the years after age 70 or for a bequest. Assuming a constant consumption
stream per person, discounting the later years back to age 70 while taking account of the likelihood that
one or both will be alive, and discounting consumption in earlier years forward yields the fraction of the
lifetime consumption of the husband and wife that must be provided for. That fraction is 0.049. (The value
0.049 is equal to 16.49/(317.55+16.49).) If one assumes instead that the interest rate is 0 when discounting
income and consumption streams, then .16 of an extra dollar of lifetime resources remains at age 70 or will
a c r u ei nf u t u r ey e a r s ,w h i l et h ee x p e c t e df r a c t i o no f consumption expenditures after age 70 is .23. (The
value .16= 6.88/43.89. The value .23=29.8/(50+50+29.8)). For both interest rates the fraction of an extra
dollar of lifetime resources that remains at age 70 thus appears to be in the general ballpark of the fraction
of lifetime consumption remaining. If we assume an interest rate of 6% and that desired consumption/year
after retirement at age 62 is only 3/4 of pre-retirement consumption, then the fraction of lifetime resources
remaining at age 70 is 0.03 and expected fraction of consumption expenditures after age 70 is 0.01. One
would like to make a further adjustment for the fact that at least part of the wealth at age 70 (eg, housing) is
not be subject to further taxes. This would raise the estimate of the fraction of lifetime resources remaining
somewhat.
We conclude that for reasonable parameter values the wealth model estimates are consistent with a world
in which on average families divide up an extra dollar of resources in accordance with expected consumption
before and after age 70, with only a small margin for intended bequests. However, the average could hide a
situation in which some families undersave while others put resources aside for planned bequests. For this
reason, our results are not inconsistent with the ﬁndings of Bernheim et al (2001) or Banks et al. (1998)
about the inadequacy of retirement savings. Furthermore, while the above calculations have the advantage
of transparency, they ignore uncertainty, involve a long list of simplifying assumptions, and the speciﬁc
estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the interest rate and preferences for pre and post retirement
consumption.
246.1 Comparison to De Nardi (2002)
We also compare our estimates to those implied by De Nardi’s (2002) fully dynamic inter-
generational model of income and wealth. The basic outline of her model is as follows. There
are overlapping generations of people and heterogeneity in productivity. The income of an
individual at age 20 is inﬂuenced in part by the income of her parent at age 45. Subse-
quently, income evolves according to a discrete Markov process until retirement at age 60.
After retirement people receive lump sum beneﬁts that do not depend upon prior earnings.
Parents have an additively separable power utility function with an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of 0.66. In some versions of the model the parents get utility from bequests.
In other versions of the model there is no bequest motive. Bequests occur at the time of
death. The probability of death is 0 prior to age 60 and is set to accord with conditional
survival probabilities for the U.S. economy for the years after age 60. The utility from the
bequest does not depend directly upon the income of the children, but it is calibrated so
that the marginal utility the parent obtains from the bequest is comparable to the marginal
utility that the child receives from the bequest. Income taxes, taxes on asset income, and
taxes on bequests are all accounted for in the analysis. The economy is closed with a standard
neoclassical production function. Retirement beneﬁts are not stochastic and do not depend
upon career earnings. The interest rate is 6%.
De Nardi’s main purpose is to examine the role of intergenerational links through income
and through a bequest motive in explaining wealth inequality, so it is not surprising that her
model has a few limitations for our purpose of evaluating the income wealth derivative.35
The ﬁrst is that the mortality rates diﬀer from those for married couples because the model
assumes only one parent. This will aﬀect both the precautionary and lifecycle savings motive
as well as the age at which bequests are made. Also, there are no inter vivos transfers in
the model, and children do not receive wealth prior to entering the labor market. Finally,
retirement beneﬁts are in lump sum form. This might raise the derivative of wealth with
respect to permanent income for persons in the low income quantiles, although we are not
clear on this.
De Nardi graciously provided us with simulated data for three speciﬁcations of her model.
For each speciﬁcation, we have information on 10,000 artiﬁcial individuals, observed for at
35DeNardi’s main ﬁnding is that voluntary bequests are the key to explaining very large estates. Unin-
tended bequests of wealth that were accumulated for lifecycle and precautionary reasons are not enough to
explain concentration at the high end of the wealth distribution.
25most 14 periods. Each period in her model represents 5 years. For each individual, we know
the earnings histories, asset histories, and year of death for a set of parents, along with the
earnings histories of their children. We constructed the equivalent of our permanent income
measure by regressing the logarithm of yearly household earnings on an age polynomial
of order 4 in deviations from age 40. The sample for the regressions was restricted to
individuals between 25 and 60 years of age. Separate regressions were run for parents and
children. We then averaged the prediction errors of each individuals and took antilogs. To
obtain the derivative of bequests with respect to income, we regressed net bequests on a
third order polynomial in permanent income, the permanent income of the child, a fourth
order polynomial in age in deviations from 70 and an interaction between permanent income
and age. Trimming made little diﬀerence.
In Table 10 we present estimates of the derivative of bequests with respect to parental
income based upon the simulated data and compare them to estimates from the PSID. We
evaluate the derivatives at various points in the income distribution estimated from the
artiﬁcial income data.
Experiment 2 corresponds to the case in which the incomes of parents and children are
linked, but there is no bequest motive. In this case EBy rises gradually from 1.184 at the
tenth quantile of income to 1.737 at the 75th quantile. It then declines to 1.520 at the 90th
quantile and to 0.879 at the 95th. We are surprised by the fact that EBy declines at high
income levels in the no bequest motive case.36
When the incomes of parents and children are linked and there is a bequest motive
(experiment 3), below the median of income the income derivatives are similar to those in
the case of no bequest motive . However, the derivatives are much higher at the 90th and
especially the 95th quantile.
The fourth column presents estimates of EBy based upon the PSID for a white couple
with both the husband and wife alive at age 60. The values of the derivative rise monoton-
ically in income. The estimate of EBy are close to those for the simulation with linked
incomes and a bequest motive up to the median of income. The PSID estimates continue
to increase through the 95th percentile of income, but the gap in the estimates increases.
One reason for the discrepancy is that the simulations use after tax income, with a linear
tax of .28. This implies that the values of EBy based on the simulations should be reduced
36A possible explanation is that the precautionary motive to save as a hedge against future income risk
and longevity risk declines at high income and wealth levels.
26by 28% to make them comparable to the PSID estimates. A second reason is that our as-
sumption that the entire bequest occurs when the second parent dies may be incorrect. The
last column of the table presents PSID estimates under the extreme assumption that all of
the diﬀerence in dW/dy between couples and widows represents the part of the bequest that
takes place when the ﬁrst parent dies. These estimates range from 2.61 at the 10th percentile
to 4.008 at the 95th percentile. If one makes both the tax adjustment and the change in
our assumption about the timing of bequests, then the PSID estimates of EBy exceed those
from the simulation with altruism at low income levels and are a little below at high income
levels.
Given the diﬀerences between the PSID data and the data concepts implicit in De Nardi’s
model, the fact that she did not make any use of the derivative of wealth with respect
to income in calibrating her model, and the inevitable simpliﬁcations in her model, we
believe that the correspondence between the estimates and the model simulations is very
encouraging. Overall, the results suggest three conclusions. First, at high income levels
the simulated EBy is much larger with a bequest motive than without one. Second, the
derivatives based upon the PSID are reasonably close to those based upon the simulated
data for income levels up to the median. At the 90th percentile the PSID derivatives lie
above the derivatives of the simulations with no bequest motive and below the derivatives
for the model with the bequest motive. The exact relationship between the PSID results
and the results based on the simulation model depends on whether we assume that part of
the bequest occurs when the ﬁrst parent dies or not and on the treatment of taxes. Third,
the monotonic increase in the PSID estimates of EBy is more in line with the pattern in the
simulated data for the model incorporating a bequest motive.
6.2 Other Results
Hurd (1989) and others compare the age proﬁle of wealth for couples with and without
children to gain insight into a possible bequest motive. To provide a possible benchmark with
which to assess the importance of altruism toward children in the wealth/income relationship,
we estimate Model II from Table 3.1 using 327 wealth observations from a sample of 112
older men and women who had no children. Variables corresponding to children, such as yk,
are of course excluded. We use the mean for the matched sample of parents and children
to standardize y for the older people who do not have children. (This makes it easier to
27compare the coeﬃcients across the samples.). In the cubic case the coeﬃcient on y is 2.37
(1.04) which is smaller than the value of 6.09 (0.61) obtained for persons with children. Thus,
we ﬁnd the relationship between wealth and parental income is stronger for parents with
children and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the age interaction
is basically zero (0.10). In Model IV of Appendix Table D3 the coeﬃcient on y ∗ Widowed
is 1.4 (1.92), and the sum of the coeﬃcients on y and y ∗ Widowed is 3.77. This estimate,
while imprecisely estimated, is similar to the value for widows and widowers with children
(Table 3.1., model IV). Furthermore, in the AHEAD sample the coeﬃcient on y is actually
higher for persons without children. (Table D4) Overall, our results on this important issue
are somewhat mixed but for the most part suggest that the relationship between wealth and
income does not depend that much on children. We should emphasize, however, that this
result is potentially consistent with a substantial bequest motive if persons without children
develop stronger attachments to other relatives, friends, or organizations and leave bequests
to them. We do not have evidence on this. Furthermore, the simulation results presented
above suggest that the wealth–income derivative is not that sensitive to the presence of a
bequest motive below the median of income. Consequently, the degree of diﬀerence between
older adults with and without children in the response of wealth late in life to income may
not say very much about the extent to which bequests are motivated by altruism.
The coeﬃcient on the sibling average of permanent income yk is also reported in the
table. As we argued above, the presence of altruism implies a negative coeﬃcient on the
child’s income term. The coeﬃcient should be zero if parents are indiﬀerent to the ﬁnancial
situation of their children. In any event, for model V in Table 3.1 the coeﬃcient on this
variable is 0.26 (.33). While the speciﬁc point estimates vary a bit, we consistently ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of child’s permanent income is small and always obtain positive signs. In
AHEAD we also obtain a small, positive, and statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
child’s income. (Table 3.2). There is little evidence that parents respond to yk by saving
less for a bequest.37
All the PSID regressions control for 1/(number of children ), the inverse of the number of
descendants. If an altruism based bequest motive plays a role in the accumulation of wealth,
the coeﬃcient on this variable should be negative. In contrast, we ﬁnd that it is positive with
37Note that yk is likely to be correlated with the error term in the parental wealth model. On one hand,
if parental wealth helps to ﬁnance human capital investments in children, then one would expect a positive
correlation. On the other hand, such investments are costly and may lead to lower wealth late in life.
Consequently, the sign of the bias in the coeﬃcient on yk is ambiguous.
28a t-value of about 1. The point estimate suggests that the total bequest is reduced by $12,747
as the number of children rises from 1 to 3. The result is not very informative about the
extent to which the bequests are driven by altruism. The positive coeﬃcient could reﬂect
a negative relationship between initial parental wealth and fertility, the fact that parents
with more kids have more child related expenses, leading to lower savings and wealth, or a
positive eﬀect of number of children on total inter vivos transfer to adult children.38
Dynan et al. (2000) implicitly test for the presence of a bequest motive using the rela-
tionship between wealth and income. They argue that a life-cycle model including a bequest
motive and uncertainty about medical expenses predicts a positive relationship between the
ratio of wealth to lifetime income for prime-age individuals. Using three household surveys,
Dynan et al (2000) document that savings rates and wealth-income ratios increase with a
measure of lifetime income.39
We checked if our PSID results are consistent with Dynan et al’s ﬁndings. We computed
wealth-income ratios using a model similar to the one included in Model II in Table 3.1.
Instead of substracting 70 from the age of the oldest person in the household, we substract 56.
The reason is that the prediction of higher wealth-income ratios for high-income households
holds for households in their prime age. First, we used the modiﬁed regression included in
Model 2 (Table 3.1) to predict wealth. Then, we obtained wealth—income ratios by dividing
predicted wealth by permanent income. Finally, we ran a regression of the predicted wealth-
income ratio on a third-order polynomial in permanent income. Contrary to Dynan et al
(2000), we obtain a U-shaped relationship between wealth-income ratios and permanent
annual income. The derivative of the wealth-income ratio with respect to income is -.019
(.016) at the average income level.40 It should be kept in mind that our sample is not the
most appropriate one to detect a bequest motive using Dynan et al’s strategy. It includes a
substantial fraction of retired households, for whom the prediction of wealth-income ratios
38Finally, we include the standard deviation of the income of the descendents in model II (not shown).If
parents are constrained to divide bequests equally, then greater dispersion of their incomes might reduce the
parents’ incentive to provide a bequest, since part of it will be “wasted” on rich children who don’t need it.
On the other hand, this implicit tax on bequests could work in the opposite direction, leading parents to
leave a larger total bequest than they would choose if they could channel the entire bequest to the needy
children. The coeﬃcient (standard error) is .31 (.63), positive, but not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
39Their results contradict Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), who use social security earnings records
matched to the HRS.
40The result is robust to a number changes in the deﬁnition of permanent income, such as dropping our
correction for secular growth in wages. It holds when we exclude realizations of income after wealth is
observed when constructing permanent income measure.
29increasing in income does not necessarily hold–see Dynan et al. (2000).
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we use matched data on parents and their adult children from the PSID as
well as the AHEAD survey of the elderly to estimate the marginal propensity of parents to
spend their lifetime resources on inter vivos gifts or bequests to their adult children. In the
absence of suﬃcient direct information about actual bequests we estimate the response of
bequests to income by combining age speciﬁc estimates of the response of wealth to income
with data on mortality rates. We use a similar strategy to estimate the present value of
inter vivos gifts associated with an extra dollar of parental income.
We have three main ﬁndings. First, white parents at the overall sample mean of per-
manent earnings pass on between 2 and 3 cents of every extra dollar of lifetime resources to
their children through a bequest. The estimate increases with income and decreases with
the assumption about the interest rate. Second, parents spend about 2 cents of an extra
dollar of lifetime resources on inter vivos transfers. The estimate is increasing in income.
Third, when we add together the two values, we conclude that parents spend about 4 cents
out of an extra dollar of parental resources on adult children. The estimates are lower for
nonwhites at a given income level. For whites we estimate that from the child’s point of
view the increased gifts and bequests associated with $13.82 increase in parental permanent
income would be equivalent to the present value of the increased earnings associated with
a $1 increase in the child’s permanent income. Using our estimate of MPS in combination
with consensus estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income, we provide a pre-
liminary estimate that 85% of the link between parental resources and the resources that a
child enjoys as an adult is through intergenerational links in human capital and about 15%
is through the eﬀect of parental resources on gifts and bequests. In addition, we provide
estimates of the age proﬁle of the wealth and inter vivos transfer responses to permanent
income.
We wish to ﬂag three obvious lines for further research. The ﬁr s ti sm a k eu s eo fd i r e c t
use of bequest data from both AHEAD and the PSID as these samples continue to age to
estimate the derivative of bequests with respect to income. Hurd and Smith (1999) provide
an initial analysis of bequest data from AHEAD. The second is to study the eﬀects of income
shocks and capital gains at various ages on expected bequests. The third is to embark on
30a full scale study of the marginal propensity of parental spending on children under 18 and
on college.
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358 Appendix A: The Eﬀect Permanent Income on Ini-
tial Wealth and Retirement Income
A relationship between the wealth of individuals early in adulthood and permanent income
that arises from monetary transfers from parents or grandparents will inﬂuence our estimates
of the relationship between permanent income and wealth late in life. Such a relationship
should be taken into account when computing the fraction of the income response of wealth
at age 70 that represents intended savings toward a bequest. To address this issue, we
estimate regression models of the response of initial wealth to permanent income of the child
using the children who are under 35 in our matched sample. These are reported in Appendix
Table A1. Model IV in Table A1 includes a cubic in yk as well as the interaction between yk
and Age-22. The results imply that at age 22 and the mean of yk,a1d o l l a ri n c r e a s ei nyk
is associated with a $0.17 increase in initial wealth.
In Appendix Table B1 we report a similar set of regressions of retirement income on
permanent income. We allow the relationship to depend on age and marital status.
9 Appendix B: Construction of the Matched Parent-
Child PSID Sample for Estimation of Wealth Models
The PSID contains a cross-year individual ﬁle and year-speciﬁch o u s e h o l dﬁles. The single-
year household ﬁles contain household-level variables collected in each wave, and the single
cross-year individual ﬁle contains individual-level variables collected from 1968 to 1999 for all
individuals who were ever in the survey. First, we excluded from the cross-year individual
ﬁle all individuals who are never observed as heads or wives/“wives.” Then, using the
cross-year individual ﬁle, we select (i) individuals who were male heads in the 1968 original
household (potential fathers) (ii) individuals who were female heads or wives/“wives” in the
1968 original household (potential mothers) and (iii) individuals who were children in at
least one of the 1968-1974 waves of the PSID. That selection is done using the “individual
relationship to head” variable. To each child, we match the information of each parent using
the original 1968 household identiﬁer. We match 6,057 children to 2,257 parents. Next, we
add to each “parent-child” match information from the 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1997 household
ﬁles. The 1997 ﬁle was the last available that could be used with the 1999 wealth ﬁle at
the time we constructed our data sets. We require that in each of the years in which we
36observe the parent-child match, the parent must be either the head or the wife/“wife” of the
household to which he or she belongs (note that we do not impose such restriction on the
child). We further restrict our sample to “parent-child” matches in which either (i) one or
both parents reaches age 60 between 1968 and 1999, or (ii) one or both parents dies between
1968 and 1997. Children who do not leave their parents to form their own household by
1997 are not included. Children who form independent households and later co-reside with
their parents continue to be followed as independent households and are included. Parents
and children for whom annual earnings are never observed, and parents for whom wealth
is never observed are excluded from the analysis. As a result, our sample contains 14,999
“parent-child”-year cases.
Additional Sample selection rules
Divorced parents: We add 943 additional records of “parent-child-year” cases in which
parents divorced and formed a new household following the divorce. In those additional
records, the child is matched to the mother. After the inclusion, the sample contains 15,942
household-years.
Wealth and permanent income: We drop 1,749 “parent-child”-year cases for which either
the wealth of the parent household, or the permanent incomes of both the father and the
mother were missing.
Age-year of birth: After selecting parents who reached age 60 for the period between 1984
and 1999, we re-examined the age variable and found that reported age was not consistent
o v e rt i m ef o rs o m ei n d i v i d u a l s .W ei m p u t e dt h ey e a ro fb i r t hf r o mt h em u l t i p l er e p o r t so f
age. The imputation of the year of birth was obtained by substracting the reported age
of the individual from the year of the interview. That imputation may vary over time if
reported age does not increase on a year-per-wave basis, in part because of variation within
the year in the survey date. In such cases we assigned the year of birth as the maximum
year of birth implied by the responses. We drop 219 cases in which the new estimated age
resulted in none of the parents reaching 60 years of age between 1984 and 1999. We also drop
139 observations for year of birth is missing for both mother and the father. The resulting
sample contains 13,835 “parent-child-year” matches.
Next, we keep one observation per parent-wave in most cases. We have two observations
per 1968 parent household if the parents divorced prior to the survey year in which wealth
is collected. In the 125 cases in which divorced parents live in the same household, we drop
37the observation on the mother. The resulting sample has 4,523 household-years for parent
households. We further drop 44 cases using the median regression analysis described in the
t e x ta n d1 0 2c a s e si nw h i c hw ed i dn o to b s e r v et h ea v e r a g ep e r m a n e n ti n c o m eo fc h i l d r e n .
The ﬁnal wealth sample has 4,377 observations.
Details of the construction of the sample use to estimate the inter vivos transfer sample
are also available upon request.
10 Appendix C: Construction of the AHEAD Sample
for 1993 and 1995
We use three ﬁles from the 1993 wave of AHEAD: the individual respondent ﬁle, the house-
hold ﬁle, and the “other persons” ﬁle. The ﬁrst ﬁle contains 8,222 individual respondent
records. We match to each individual the household records, with information on income
and wealth. We select one individual per 1993 household. We keep one observation per
household, obtaining a sample of 6,046 households of potential parents.
The “other persons” ﬁle contains records on 17,424 persons. We drop 2,369 cases of
“other persons” who were neither sons nor daughters of the respondents. Next, we merge
the resulting sample of “other persons” to their parents using the 1993 household identiﬁer.
The resulting 1993 sample contained 15,055 records of parent-child matches.
Occupation: We drop 2,727 parent-child matches in which the occupation of the father
in the longest-held job was missing.
Child variables: We then delete 1,357 parent-child cases for which we could not assign
income of the child in the following categories: less than 20,000, between 20,000 and 30,000,
between 30,000 and 50,000 and more than 50,000. We also drop 644 parent-child matches
for which the head in the household of the child is missing or below 21.
Education: We also drop 1,169 parent-child matches for which the number of years of
education of the father is either missing or less than 5 years. We drop 323 cases for which
the number of years of education of the mother is either missing or less than 5 years.
Age: We could not impute the year of birth of the father for 64 parent-child matches.
Overall, we could impute permanent income of the child and parent for 6,751 parent-child
matches.
W em e r g e dt h e1 9 9 3s a m p l eo f6 , 7 5 1p a r e n t - c h ildren with observations from 1995 wave of
AHEAD. Our sample contained 15,629 parent-child-year matches for which we could impute
38both the permanent income of parents and the average permanent income of the children.
Change in marital status: We drop 56 cases corresponding to parent-child cases for which
parents had changed their marital status between waves. We selected one observation per
parental household-year, which leaves us with a sample of 4,854 cases.
We drop 166 cases for which we could not identify the mother. We delete 54 additional
cases from the 1995 wave because we could note identify the age of either parent. The
resulting sample contained 4,634 household-years. We eliminate 46 outliers using the same
trimming strategy used with the PSID sample.
11 Appendix D: Construction of the Permanent Com-
ponent of Annual Labor Earnings, yi
We used the panel data on all individuals from the PSID who were either a head or a wife
to construct the measures of permanent earnings. In constructing the permanent income
measures we make use of the regression model
(11) lnyit = γ0 + X1itγ1 + X2iγ2 + Dtγt + f(ageit)γ4 + vi + uit,
where ln yit is the logarithm of the sum of real labor earnings of the head and wife in the
family that person i belonged to in year t and the vector X1it consists of a set of marital
status dummies, an indicator for children, and the number of children, X2i consists of a
vector of six dummies for educational attainment and race, Dt is a vector of dummies for
the years 1968 to 1997 with 1993 as the omitted category, f(ageit) is a vector of the ﬁrst 4
powers of age (centered at 40), vi is a time invariant person speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t ,a n duit is
a transitory component. We estimate (11) by OLS using observations for a particular year
if labor earnings exceeded $900 in 1993 dollars and the household head was between the
ages of 20 and 61. Separate models are estimated for men and women. The samples used
to estimate the permanent income regressions consists of observations on individuals who
are heads or wives/“wives” in years between 1968 and 1997. The samples contains 99,689
individual-years for males and 109,107 individual-years for females. Details of how it was
selected are available upon request. We then estimate vi as the average of the OLS residuals
for person i.




[exp{ˆ γ0 + X2iˆ γ2 +ˆ vi + Dc+age+40ˆ γc+age+40]/41
where the subscript c indicates year of birth and where we have removed the eﬀects of f(ageit)
by setting age to 40 in all years.41
Including the demographic variables X1itγ1in the construction of yi for the years that
we observe had little eﬀect on our estimates of the wealth/parental income derivative. By
using the above adjusted average of family earnings to construct permanent income, we are
implicitly assuming that the variance and degree of serial correlation in uit is suﬃciently
weak that the variance across households in lifetime earnings contributed by X2iγ2+vi+uit
is dominated by the permanent component X2iγ2 + vi.42
Note that the estimates of the age proﬁle and the coeﬃcients on the year dummies will
pick up the eﬀects of variation across birth cohorts in the mean of vi, because the eﬀects
of age, cohort, and time are not separately identiﬁed. We assume that vi is orthogonal
to birth cohort conditional on education and race. Under this assumption, the age proﬁle
f(.) and the year dummy coeﬃcients γ3 are identiﬁed. Since the PSID starts in 1967, we
estimate year eﬀects by linking the year eﬀect estimates for the 1967-1997 period based on
the PSID to aggregate time series data on annual earnings of full time employees in the
private sector. We use a ratio link based on the average from 1967-1969 of the aggregate
wage series and corresponding elements of γ3 for the years 1967-1969. We relegate the
details to a footnote. We use a labor force quality index constructed by Denison (1974,
page 32, Table 4-1) to account for the eﬀects of shifts in the age-sex composition of hours
41Using the geometric average
yi =e x p [
20 X
age=−20
{ˆ γ0 + X2iˆ γ2 +ˆ vi + Dc+age+40ˆ γc+age+40}/41]
made little diﬀerence in the results. Allowing age to vary when computing permanent income also made
little diﬀerence. Accounting for eﬀects of variance in uit when going from logs to levels when constructing
for permanent income would imply multiplying our estimates of yi by the factor of 1.20 for men and 1.23 for
women. This would reduce our estimates of the response of wealth to yi by about 17%.
42Suppose that uit = ρuit−1 + ξit where ξit is iid with variance σ2
ξ.I fui1 = ξi1 then one may show that
the contribution of ui1 to ui42 to the variance across households of the sum of Yit from age 18 to 60 is
var(ξ)
P42
k=1 [(1 − ρk)/(1 − ρ)]2)
If ρ is .65, then this expression equals 325.67var(ξ). The contribution of X2iγ2 +vi is 422var(X2iγ2 +vi)
= 1764var(X2iγ2 +vi).. Consequently, even if var(ξit) were as large as.5var(X2iγ2 +vi), then variation in
vi would account for 91.5% of the variance in accumulated earnings or in average earnings per year over the
lifecycle, after abstracting from the contribution of the age earnings proﬁle. If ρ = .85 the corresponding
variance percentage is 70% .
40as well as intragroup changes, intergroup shifts, and changes in the amount of education
on the eﬃciency of an hour of work. We use nominal average annual earnings of full time
employees, Series D 722 from the Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1970,
page 164 divided by the CPI. Denison does not report values for years prior to 1929, 1930-
1939, or 1942-1946. We assigned the 1929 value for the small number cases earlier than 1929.
We ﬁlled in missing values for 1930-1939 and 1942-1946 by linear interpolation of the log
of the index. We strongly suspect that the eﬀect of any remaining errors in accounting for
trends in cohort quality and in aggregate labor market factors will have only a small eﬀect
on d ˆ Wa(yi,Z,D a,a)/dyi given the huge within cohort variance in permanent income and the
fact that we control for age, time, and the interaction between age and time in the wealth
models. The wealth models control for a fourth order polynomial in the age of the oldest
parent and dummy variables for the year of the wealth observation, which will absorb some
of the eﬀects of any unobserved diﬀerences across cohorts. The estimates of the response of
wealth to income are reduced by about 20% if one does not account for economy wide time
trends in earnings when constructing yi.
41Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Matched PSID Sample 
 Mean Minimum Maximum
Variable (sd)   
PARENTAL VARIABLES (N=4377)
Wealth holding, all years 184.811 -195.07 3010.5
(296.95)
Wealth holding in 1984 153.917 -15.372 2,733.05
(278.018)
Wealth holding in 1989 178.522 -36.857 2,827.27
(288.489)
Wealth holding in 1994 188.231 -33.162 3,010.49
(300.625)
Wealth holding in 1999 243.304 -25.544 2997.2
(326.673)
Permanent earnings, father  43.558 1.010 308.07
(27.234)
# observations of income, father 15.57 1 30
(7.44)
Permanent earnings, mother  42.948 1.015 362.66
(27.234)
# observations of income, mother 17 1 30
(7.99)
Nonwhite 0.31 0 1
Education of the father (years) 11.44 0 20
(3.66)
Education of the mother (years) 11.68 0 18
(2.65)
Only father present in 1968 hh 0.01 0 1
Only mother present in 1968 hh 0.11 0 1
Father and mother present in 1968 0.88 0 1
Age of the father 63.08 37 88
(8.09)
Age of the mother 61.28 35 86
(8.66)
Number of children 3.48 1 20
(2.52)
Parents divorced 0.2 0 1
Parents divorced, father remarried 0.07 0 1
Parents divorced, mother remarried 0.05 0 1
Father is a widower 0.06 0 1
Mother is a widow 0.19 0 1
Parent widow, father remarried 0.02 0 1
Parent widow, mother remarried 0.02 0 1
VARIABLES OF THE CHILD (Nobs=12861)    
Wealth holding (includes housing) 99.8 -918 16,458
(437.08)
Permanent income 52.95 3.36 237.89
(26.27)
Education (years) 13.28 6 17
(2.11)
Age of the kid 33.82 21 60
Kid is a female 0.49
Kid is a female head 0.17
Kid is not married 0.29    
Notes to Table 1.
All income and wealth measures are in thousands of 1993 dollars. The parental sample is an unbalanced panel of 1389 
households from 1,281 1968 parent households.  Divorced couples contribute up to two observations in a given year. 
Each of the original 1968 parent households contributes between 1 and 8 wealth observations to the matched sample. 
Wealth includes value of real estate (including own home), cars, trucks and motor homes, trucks motor home, business 
owned, shares of stock, or investment trusts (including IRAs), checking and savings accounts, rights in trusts or estates, 
life insurance policies and pensions from previous jobs. Debts are subtracted from the former, as well as student loans or 
bills of any members of the household. We drop wealth observations corresponding to the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles 
of the prediction errors from a median regression of wealth on parental income and demographics. The sample of kids is 
an unbalanced panel of 4,211 splitoffs from the original 1281 1968 parent households. Note that the averages across 
siblings are used as the controls for child characteristics in the wealth and transfers regressions reported in Table 3.1 and 7Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Sample of Parents in AHEAD
Mean Minimum Maximum
Variable (sd)   
PARENTAL VARIABLES (N=4,588)
Wealth holdings of the parent 192.366 -42 2,476
(258.819)
Parental permanent earnings, imputed 44.888 7.523 129.362
(15.629)
Nonwhite 0.08 0 1
Education of the father (years) 11.68 0 17
(3.23)
Education of the mother (years) 11.89 6 17
(2.52)
Age of the father 76.84 48 98
(5.27)
Age of the mother 75.71 43 101
(6.55)
Number of children 2.95 1 14
(1.77)
Father is a widow 0.10 0 1
Mother is a widow 0.43 0 1
Father and mother are alive and together 0.41 0 1
No father found 0.01 0 1
Parent alone, divorced 0.03 0 1
Variables used for the imputation
Parental Occupation
Managers and professionals 0.29 0 1
Clerical 0.05 0 1
Sales 0.06 0 1
Craftsmen 0.27 0 1
Operatives 0.19 0 1
Laborers 0.05 0 1
Service 0.03 0 1
Farmers 0.03 0 1
VARIABLES OF THE CHILD (N*=6,573)
Permanent income 51.245 12.230 122.297
(18.927)
Age of the head 47 21 84
(8.71)
Family income below 20,000 0.14 0 1
Family income between 20,000 and 30,000 0.16 0 1
Family income between 30,000 and 50,000 0.33 0 1
Family income above 50,000 0.38 0 1
Years of schooling, head of the household 13.66 1 17
(2.31)
Years of schooling, wife of the household 13.75 1 17
(2.23)
Child married male 0.39 0 1
Child married female 0.36 0 1
Chid single male 0.11 0 1
Child single female 0.14 0 1
Head is not employed 0.14 0 1
Head works part-time 0.04 0 1
Wife not employed (if present) 0.29 0 1
Wife works part-time (if present) 0.15 0 1
Notes to Table 2
Income and Wealth variables are in thousands of 1993 dollars.
"Father" is defined as the current married male respondent in a two person household or
the late spouse of a respondent who is widow or
the ex-spouse of a divorced female respondent.
"Mother" is defined as the current married female respondent in a two person household or
the late spouse of a respondent who is a widower or
the ex-spouse of a divorced male respondent.
(*) The number of observations of children correspond to the number of parent-child matches in 1993Table 3.1 Wealth Model Estimates, Matched PSID Sample of Parents
Dependent variable: wealth holdings of a household (1,000s of 1993 $)
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Yp 5.24 4.29 4.38 5.617 6.09
(.431) (.47) (.44) (.575) (.610)
Yp * Yp 0.055 0.047 0.041 0.037
(.010) (.011) (.011) ( .011)
Yp * Yp * Yp -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.00018 -.0002
(.00004) (.00005) (.00006) (.00005)
Yp * (Age - 70) 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.069
(.036) (.038) (.03) (.035) (.034)
(Yp * Yp)*(Age - 70) 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0006
(.0009) (.0009) (0.0008)
Yp * (Widowed) -2.44 -2.3
(.72) (.70)
Yp * (Divorced/Sep) -2.25 -2.02
(.87) ( .92)
Yp * Nonwhite   -2.20
( .69)
Yk (sibling average of permanent inc.) 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.247 0.26
 (.34) (.33) (0.33) (.33) (  .33)
Control Variables in All Models: (Coefficients displayed for Model 5 only.)
1/(number of children) 19.12
(21.34)
Mother not present in 1968 hh -31.46
(41.11)
Father not present in 1968 hh -44.42
(16.05)
age minus 70 0.55
(1.27)
age minus 70 squared -0.185
(.066)
age minus 70 cubic 0.0009
(.004)
age minus 70 quartic 0.00008
(.0001)
Parents divorced, father rem. 31.03
(28.16)












Nonwhite -102.46Table 3.1 Results of the Matched Sample (PSID) -cont.
Dependent variable: wealth holdings of a household (1,000s of 1993 $)
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Second record, divorced -36.52
(26.75)
Number of kids who are female -4.83
(4.08)









   (18.71)
Sample size: 4,377
Wealth outliers trimmed
Standard errors in parentheses account for unbalanced panel structure 
and heteroscedasticity.
Parental permanent earnings Yp is the deviation from the unweighted sample mean
Income and wealth are measured in 1,000s of 1993 $
permanent income of the children is the mean across siblings
The R2 for models I, II, III, IV, and V are 0.3, 0.32, 0.32, 0.32 and 0.33 respectivelyTable 3.2  Wealth Model Estimates: AHEAD sample of parents
Dependent variable: wealth holdings of a household (1,000s of 1993 $)
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Yp 6.72 5.27 5.99 6.147
(.63) (.75) (.82) (.84)
Yp * Yp 0.058 .05 .046
(0.022) (.023) (.023)
Yp * (Age - 70) -0.115 0.18 .166 0.15
(.05) (.18) (.18) (.18)
(Yp * Yp)*(Age - 70) -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0022
(.0015) (.0016) (.0016)
Yp * (Widowed) -1.33 -1.32
(.71) (.71)
Yp * (Divorced/Sep) -1.87 -1.84
(1.79) (1.78)
Yp * Nonwhite -1.39
(.86)
Average Income, kids 0.34 0.53 0.515 0.52
 (.30) (.30) (.30) (.30)
Control Variables in All Models: (Coefficients displayed for Model 4 only.)
1/(number of children) 23.54
(14.13)
Mother not found -
Father not found 107.44
(85.07)
age minus 70 -4.60
(5.17)
age minus 70 squared 0.24
(0.29)
age minus 70 cubic -0.013
(0.024)










Average number of kids who are married females 2.93
(12.90)









Standard errors in parentheses account for unbalanced panel structure 
and heteroscedasticity, but not for the fact that Yp and the average permanent income of children are estimated
Parental permanent earnings Yp is the deviation from the unweighted sample mean
Income and wealth are measured in 1,000s of 1993 $
permanent income of the children is the mean across siblingsTable 4 Response of Expected Bequests to Annual Permanent Income, Whites (PSID)
Panel A: The probability of observing a bequest at different ages 
White couple, both of age 60, average permanent income
Age Smt Sft Hmt Hft dW(t)/dy dW(t)/dy widow Pbt Pbt-wid
60 1.000 1 5.676 0.000
61 0.986 0.992 0.015 0.008 5.741 3.441 0.000 0.000
62 0.972 0.984 0.016 0.009 5.806 3.506 0.000 0.000
63 0.956 0.975 0.018 0.010 5.871 3.571 0.000 0.001
64 0.938 0.965 0.019 0.011 5.936 3.636 0.000 0.001
65 0.920 0.955 0.021 0.012 6.001 3.701 0.000 0.001
66 0.901 0.944 0.023 0.013 6.066 3.766 0.000 0.002
67 0.880 0.932 0.025 0.014 6.131 3.831 0.000 0.003
68 0.858 0.919 0.027 0.015 6.196 3.896 0.000 0.003
69 0.835 0.905 0.029 0.016 6.261 3.961 0.000 0.004
70 0.811 0.890 0.032 0.018 6.326 4.026 0.000 0.005
71 0.785 0.874 0.035 0.020 6.391 4.091 0.000 0.006
72 0.757 0.857 0.038 0.022 6.456 4.156 0.001 0.008
73 0.728 0.838 0.042 0.024 6.521 4.221 0.001 0.010
74 0.697 0.818 0.046 0.026 6.587 4.287 0.001 0.011
75 0.665 0.797 0.050 0.029 6.652 4.352 0.001 0.013
76 0.632 0.774 0.054 0.031 6.717 4.417 0.001 0.016
77 0.598 0.750 0.059 0.034 6.782 4.482 0.001 0.018
78 0.563 0.725 0.064 0.037 6.847 4.547 0.001 0.021
79 0.527 0.698 0.069 0.041 6.912 4.612 0.001 0.024
80 0.490 0.669 0.075 0.045 6.977 4.677 0.001 0.027
81 0.453 0.639 0.082 0.051 7.042 4.742 0.001 0.031
82 0.416 0.607 0.090 0.056 7.107 4.807 0.001 0.034
83 0.378 0.573 0.099 0.062 7.172 4.872 0.002 0.038
84 0.341 0.537 0.107 0.069 7.237 4.937 0.002 0.042
85 0.304 0.500 0.115 0.076 7.302 5.002 0.002 0.045
86 0.269 0.462 0.124 0.084 7.367 5.067 0.002 0.048
87 0.236 0.423 0.135 0.094 7.432 5.132 0.002 0.051
88 0.204 0.383 0.147 0.104 7.497 5.197 0.002 0.054
89 0.174 0.343 0.159 0.115 7.562 5.262 0.001 0.055
90 0.146 0.304 0.172 0.127 7.628 5.328 0.001 0.056
91 0.121 0.265 0.186 0.140 7.693 5.393 0.001 0.055
92 0.099 0.228 0.202 0.155 7.758 5.458 0.001 0.054
93 0.079 0.193 0.218 0.171 7.823 5.523 0.001 0.052
94 0.062 0.160 0.234 0.186 7.888 5.588 0.001 0.048
95 0.047 0.130 0.249 0.201 7.953 5.653 0.000 0.043
96 0.035 0.104 0.263 0.217 8.018 5.718 0.000 0.038
97 0.026 0.081 0.279 0.234 8.083 5.783 0.000 0.032
98 0.019 0.062 0.294 0.251 8.148 5.848 0.000 0.027
99 0.013 0.047 0.309 0.267 8.213 5.913 0.000 0.022
100 0.000 0.000 1 1.000 8.278 5.978 0.001 0.059
Panel B: Estimates of the expected response of bequests to annual permanent income
10th percentile  Average  90th percentile 
(Yp=18,640) (Yp=46,240) (Yp=76,030)
Expected derivative 1.68 2.56 3.10
(standard error) (.76) (.44) (.66)
Pbt: Probability of observing a bequest in period t if both members are alive on the previous period. 
Pbt- wid: Probability of observing a bequest in period t if only one member of the couple was alive 
A bequest occurs once both members are dead
dW(t)/dy : Effect of permanent income y on wealth holdings of a couple at age t
dW(t) /dy widow : Effect of permanent income y on wealth holdings of a widow(er) at age t
Expected derivative: sum of dW(t)/dy weighted by the probability of observing the bequest. 
Standard errors in Panel B are derived using the delta method.Table 5 Response of Expected Bequests to Permanent Income, Nonwhites (PSID)
Panel A: The probability of observing a bequest at different ages 
Nonwhite couple, both of age 60, 10th income percentile
Age Smt Sft Hmt Hft dW/dy dW/dy widow Pbeq Pbeq widow
60 1.000 1.000 3.476 0.000
61 0.976 0.987 0.024 0.013 3.541 1.241 0.000 0.000
62 0.951 0.972 0.025 0.014 3.606 1.306 0.000 0.001
63 0.925 0.957 0.027 0.016 3.671 1.371 0.000 0.001
64 0.898 0.941 0.029 0.017 3.736 1.436 0.000 0.002
65 0.870 0.924 0.032 0.018 3.801 1.501 0.000 0.003
66 0.840 0.906 0.034 0.020 3.866 1.566 0.001 0.005
67 0.810 0.887 0.036 0.021 3.931 1.631 0.001 0.006
68 0.779 0.867 0.038 0.022 3.996 1.696 0.001 0.007
69 0.747 0.846 0.041 0.024 4.061 1.761 0.001 0.009
70 0.714 0.824 0.044 0.026 4.126 1.826 0.001 0.011
71 0.680 0.801 0.047 0.028 4.191 1.891 0.001 0.012
72 0.646 0.777 0.051 0.030 4.256 1.956 0.001 0.015
73 0.611 0.752 0.054 0.032 4.321 2.021 0.001 0.017
74 0.575 0.726 0.058 0.035 4.387 2.087 0.001 0.019
75 0.540 0.699 0.061 0.037 4.452 2.152 0.001 0.021
76 0.506 0.671 0.064 0.040 4.517 2.217 0.001 0.023
77 0.471 0.643 0.068 0.043 4.582 2.282 0.001 0.025
78 0.437 0.613 0.072 0.046 4.647 2.347 0.001 0.028
79 0.403 0.582 0.078 0.050 4.712 2.412 0.001 0.030
80 0.368 0.550 0.086 0.056 4.777 2.477 0.001 0.034
81 0.334 0.515 0.094 0.062 4.842 2.542 0.001 0.037
82 0.300 0.480 0.101 0.068 4.907 2.607 0.001 0.040
83 0.268 0.445 0.107 0.074 4.972 2.672 0.001 0.042
84 0.238 0.410 0.113 0.079 5.037 2.737 0.001 0.042
85 0.210 0.375 0.118 0.085 5.102 2.802 0.001 0.043
86 0.183 0.341 0.125 0.091 5.167 2.867 0.001 0.043
87 0.159 0.308 0.133 0.098 5.232 2.932 0.001 0.043
88 0.136 0.275 0.143 0.107 5.297 2.997 0.001 0.043
89 0.115 0.243 0.156 0.116 5.362 3.062 0.001 0.043
90 0.095 0.212 0.170 0.128 5.428 3.128 0.001 0.042
91 0.078 0.182 0.185 0.140 5.493 3.193 0.001 0.041
92 0.062 0.155 0.200 0.152 5.558 3.258 0.000 0.038
93 0.049 0.129 0.212 0.163 5.623 3.323 0.000 0.035
94 0.038 0.107 0.221 0.172 5.688 3.388 0.000 0.031
95 0.029 0.087 0.229 0.183 5.753 3.453 0.000 0.027
96 0.022 0.070 0.240 0.197 5.818 3.518 0.000 0.023
97 0.017 0.055 0.253 0.211 5.883 3.583 0.000 0.020
98 0.012 0.043 0.265 0.226 5.948 3.648 0.000 0.016
99 0.009 0.033 0.278 0.239 6.013 3.713 0.000 0.013
100 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 6.078 3.778 0.000 0.041
Panel B: Estimates of the expected response of bequests to annual permanent income
10th perc. Mean 90th perc.
(Y=18,640) (Y=46,240) (Y=76,030)
Expected derivative: .21 1.46 2.12
(standard error) (.73) (.45) (.71)
Notes: See Table 4.Table 6: The Effect of parental lifetime resources on expected bequests (EBy/(dY*/dy)
10th percentile  Average 90th  percentile 
(Yp=18,640) (Yp=46,240) (Yp=76,030)
1. PSID whites .013 .019 .023
(.006) (.003) (.005)
2. AHEAD,whites .024 .028 .03
(.009) (.0085) (.008)
3. PSID, nonwhites .002 .011 .016
(.006) (.003) (.005)
4. AHEAD, nonwhites .016 .023 .027
(.0066) (.0088) (.009)
The computations assume an interest rate of 4%
Standard errrors in parenthesis. The reported standard errors do not account for cross-correlations betweeen 
unobservables driving wealth accumulation at age 70, initial wealth and post-retirement income 
In the AHEAD case, standard errors ignoring the fact that the permanent income measures are generated.
The Table presents estimates of the derivative of expected bequests with respect to the present value of parental 
lifetime resources Y*: EBy/(dY*/dy), The calculation of EBy is explained in the text and documented in Table 4 and 
5 in the PSID case. The value of dY*/dy is 132.11 for whites with average income and 130.5 for non-whites with 
average income. See the text for an explanation of how it is computed.Table 7 The Effect of Permanent income on Intervivos transfers.
OLS  Probit model OLS, R > 0 Tobit model
Dependent variable: Transfer amount 0 if R = 0 Transfer Amount Transfer amount
  (includes zeroes) 1 if R > 0 (zeroes excluded) (includes zeroes)
Yp .056 .017 .059 .118
(.014) (.003) (.031) (.0189)
Yp * Yp .0005 .000018 .0009 .0002
(.0003) (.9e-5) (.0008) (.0005)
Yp * Yp * Yp -1e-5 -3.51e-06 -.00002 -.00001
(3.7e-6) (1.67e-06) (9e-6) (4.98e-06)
Yp * Yp * Yp * Yp 5e-8 1.70e-08 5.00E-08 5.66e-08
(1.2e-8) (6.89e-09) (2e-8) (1.32e-08)
Yp * (Age - 70) 3.8e-4 .0003 .0004 .001
(5e-4) (.0003) (.002) (.0016)
(Yp * Yp)*(Age - 70) 2e-5 - .00004 .00002
(6e-4) - (.00001) (9.59e-06)
Yp * (Widowed) -.053 -.0113 -.056 -.112
(.012) (.0062) (.035) (.032)
Yp * (Divorced/Sep) -.034 .001 -.06 -.0272
(.011) (.004) (.028) (.024)
Yp * Nonwhite -.011 .002 -.007 .0027
(.007) (.005) (.05) (.027)
kids permanent inc (Yk), sibling average -.007 0 -0.02  -.010
  (.0051) (0.002) .013 (.0098)
age minus 70  .0260 .0226 (.074) .143
(.018) (.0064) (.047) (.039)
age minus 70 squared  .0018 - - -
(.0023) - - -
age minus 70 cubic -1e-5 - - -
(-1e-4) - - -
age minus 70 quartic -9.27e-06 - - -
(6.70e-06) - - -
Parents divorced, father rem.  .0878 .413 .19 2.02
(.174) (.187) (.58) (1.05)
Parents divorced, mother rem.  .257 -.282 1.21 -.640
(.175) (.183) (.52) (1.02)
Parents divorced -.740 -.618 -1.11 -3.67
(.161) (.161) (.54) (.963)
Mother divorced, second record .17 .259 .42 1.36
(.14) (.158) (.51) (.99)
Widower -1,054 -1.37 -1.37 -.939
(.345) (.187) (.64) (1.50)
Widow -1,067 -.01 .6 -7.66
(.196) (.268) (1.5) (1.11)
Widower, remarried .950 -.374 3.19 -.1170
.665 (.397) (2.35) (2.386)
Nonwhite -.397 -.037 -.93 -.596
(.140) (.098) (.36) (.566)
Mean age of children -.0146 -.050 .005 -.238
.0147 (.010) (.07) (.061)
N. of children who are single males .403 .186 0.78 1.29
Sample Size: 1391 1391 1391 1391
Notes: Transfers are aggregrated over children. In the probit and tobit columns
we represent the coefficients of the latent index model.
In the first columns, standard errors in parentheses account for unbalanced panel structure 
and heteroscedasticity. In the Tobit case, standard errors are not adjusted.Table 8: The derivative of expected lifetime intervivos transfers with respect to parental resources (ERY*)
10th percentile  Average  90th percentile 
(Yp=18,640) (Yp=44,260) (Yp=76,030)
1. Regression including zeros -.0013 .023 .022
(whites) (.0057) (.0055) (.008)
2. Probit+flexible OLS -.0002 .0124 .019
(whites) (.0046) (.005) (.013)
3. Tobit .004 .012 .015
(whites) (.002) (.0025) (.0053)
4. Regression including zeros -.005 .017 .0155
(non whites) (.0047) (.005) (.008)
5. Probit+flexible OLS 0 .008 .0128
(nonwhites) (.0037) (.0056) (.014)
6. Tobit .004 .012 .014
(nonwhites) (.002) (.0033) (.0074)
Standard errors in parentheses. The computations assume an interest rate of 4%.
(1) Standard errors in the Probit+Flexible OLS specification do not allow for correlation among
the estimators of the Probit model and the estimators in the Post-retirement income regression.
(2) Standard errors in the Tobit specification do not allow for correlation within dynasties.
The Table presents estimates of ERY*, the effect of an extra dollar of lifetime resources on expected 
lifetime intervivos transfers using the Transfer model estimates in Table 7. We first compute ERy, the 
derivative of the expected discounted present value of transfers with respect to parental permanent 
income y. We then devide the estimate of ERy by dY*/dy, the derivative of the discounted value of 
lifetime resources (initial wealth, earnings, and post retirement income) with respect to y.












Effect of $1 
increase in yk on 
child's lifetime 
earnings, 
discounted to age 
25
Effect of $1 
increase in yp on 
child's lifetime 
earnings, 
discounted to age 
25
Effect of $1 increase in 
yp on expected value 
of bequest to child, 
discounted to age 25
Effect of $1 increase 
in yp on expected 
value of intervivos 
transfers  to child, 
discounted to age 
25
Increase in yp required 
to compensate child for 
$1 decrease in yk           
(col 5/(col 7 + col 8))
Effect of y on transfer and 
bequests as a fraction of 
total effect of y on resources 
of adult children              [col 
7+col 8]/[col 6+col 7+col 8]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Whites   Non whites Whites   Non whites Whites       Non whites Whites       Non whites
1a. 0.4 0 0.04 none 22.62 9.05 1.17          .67 .75             .51  11.77           19.21 .18           .11
2a. 0.4 0 0.04
divide 
bequests and 
transfers by 3 22.62 9.05 .39            .22 .25             .17  35.31           57.62 .07           .04
3a. 0.4 0.27 0.04
divide 
bequests and 
transfers by 3 16.51 6.60 .39            .22 .25             .17  25.78           42.07 .09           .06
4a. 0.28 0.27 0.04
divide 
bequests and 
transfers by 3 16.51 4.62 .39            .22 .25             .17  25.78           42.07 .12          .08
Wealth Models on a Per Child Basis, Transfer Models Estimated Using Data for for Individual Children
Whites      Non whites Whites  Non whites Whites  Non whites Whites  Non whites
1b. 0.4 0 0.04
assume 3 
children 22.62 9.05 .79            .62 .39            .35 18.92           23.28 .12           .10
2b. 0.4 0.27 0.04
assume 3 
children 16.51 6.60 .79            .62 .39            .35 13.81           16.99 .15           .13
3b. 0.28 0.27 0.04
assume 3 
children 16.51 4.62 .79            .62 .39            .35 13.82           16.99 .20           .17
4b. 0.28 0.27 0.04
assume 1 
child 16.51 4.62 .92            .51 .61            .45 10.68           17.26 .25           .17
5b. 0.4 0.27 0.04
assume 3 
children 16.51 6.60 .79            .62 .39            .35 13.82           16.99 .15           .13Table 10 Derivative of bequests with respect to parental permanent income:
r=0.06 Permanent
income Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 PSID Wealth Model PSID Wealth Model
No bequest motive No bequest motive Bequest motive Table 3.1 Table 3.1, Part of Bequest
No productivity links Productivity links Productivity links (white couple) after death of first parent
10th quantile 17,048 0.938 1.184 1.476 1.39 2.61
(.072) (.072) (.507) (.587) (.67)
25th quantile 21,852 1.133 1.327 1.596 1.54 2.76
(.052) (.051)  (.363) (.519) (.61)
Median 35,903 1.552 1.628 2.08 1.936 3.156
(.023) (.023) (.171) (.366) (.51)
75th quantile 58,987 1.744 1.737 3.288 2.423 3.643
(.037) (.036) (.242) (.37) (.54)
90th quantile 75,608 1.502 1.520 4.48 2.65 3.87
(.028) (.031) (.225) (.51) (.66)
95th quantile 96,913 0.724 0.879 6.401 2.788 4.008
(.07) (.101) (.754) (.71) (.82)
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.14 0.33
Computations for Experiments 1-3 use simulated data
The distribution of earnings is taken from the simulated data 
The coefficients are calculated from a regression of bequests on a third order 
polynomial of lifetime resources, an interaction of lifetime resources and age of death
and another interaction of lifetime resources squared and age of death. A fourth
order polynomial on age of death is also included. The coefficients reported are the
derivative of the value of bequests at age 70 with respect to permanent income
Mortality rates for all columns are taken from De Nardi (2002).Appendix Table A1: Regression of Initial Wealth Holding on Permanent Income 
Dependent variable: first observation of wealth holding of a child
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
yk 0.32 0.15 0.14 0.17
(0.04) (0.055) (0.06) (0.07)














Child is a female 3.03
(1.67)
Child not married -16.13
(1.91)
Wealth observed in 84 -19.41
(8.73)





The standard errors (in parentheses) allow for arbitrary correlation and heteroscedasticity
within the family.
yk (permanent annual earnings of children) is in deviation from sample means.Table B1:  Regression of Post Retirement Non Asset Income on Permanent Income 













































The standard errors (in parentheses) allow for arbitrary correlation and heteroscedasticity
within observations belonging to the same individual.
Yp (income) is in deviation from sample means.Appendix Table C1 Summary Statistics of the Matched PSID Sample, Transfer Models
 Mean Minimum Maximum
Variable (sd)   
Proportion of parents who give 0.33 0 1
Sum of intervivos transfers 0.360 0 61.89
(2.478)
Permanent earnings, father  43.558 1.01 308.07
(27.234)
Nonwhite 0.32 0 1
Education of the father (years) 11.44 0 24
(3.66)
Education of the mother (years) 11.68 0 18
(2.65)
Age of the father 63.08 37 88
(8.09)
Age of the mother 61.28 35 86
(8.66)
Number of children 3.48 1 20
(2.52)
Parents divorced 0.2 0 1
Parents divorced, father remarried 0.11 0 1
Parents divorced, mother remarried 0.09 0 1
Father is a widower 0.04 0 1
Mother is a widow 0.14 0 1
Parent widow, father remarried 0.02 0 1
Parent widow, mother remarried 0.02 0 1
Average permanent income of children 43.11 18 71
(26.27)
Average age of children 31.6 19 81
(6.84)
Number of children who are single males 0.19 0 1
Number of children who are single females 0.16 0 1
Number of children who are married females 0.33 0 1
Sample size: 2905
All magnitudes are in thousands of 1993 dollarsTable D1 Summary Statistics for Childless Adults (PSID)
Mean Minimum Maximum
Variable (sd)   
PARENTAL VARIABLES (N=327)
Wealth holdings  184.87 -15.54 5339
(409)
Permanent earnings, elderly male 44.536 3.096 126.546
(27.417)
Permanent earnings, elderly female 47.731 3.775 139.59
(31.122)
Nonwhite .262 0 1
Education of the elderly male (years) 11.5 3 17
(3.91)
Education of the elderly female (years) 12.02 3 17
(3.52)
Elderly male in 1968 hh was not found 0.49    
Elderly female in 1968 hh was not found 0.16    
Both male and female found in 1968 0.35
Age of the elderly male 67.13 42 90
(9.63)
Age of the elderly female 69.24 41 90
(9.92)
Couple divorced 0.18
Couple divorced, male rem. 0.01
Couple divorced, female rem. 0.01
Widower 0.02
Widow 0.19
Widower, male remarried 0
Widow, female remarried 0.02
All magnitudes are in thousands of 1993 dollars
The parental sample is an unbalanced panel of 112 original households. 
We observe at most four observations per household. Divorced couples contribute 
two observations 
The definition of wealth is the one provided by the PSID. It includes the following items:
Value of real estate (including own home) cars, trucks motor home, business owned, 
shares of stock, or investment trusts (including Individual Retirement Accounts),
 checking and savings accounts rights in trusts or state and life insurance policy 
Debts are substracted from the former , as well as student loans
 Appendix Table D2 Summary Statistics of Elderly without children, AHEAD
Mean Minimum Maximum
Variable (sd)   
Wealth holdings  156,014 -47.5 3000.5
(278.91)
Permanent earnings, imputed 58.74 21.56 466
(39.484)
Nonwhite .196 0 1
Education of male (years) 11.85 6 17
(2.98)
Education of female (years) 11.71 6 17
(2.52)
Age of elderly male 78.79 58 92
(5.95)
Age of elderly female 79.99 50 103
(6.91)
Widower 0.12 0 1
Widow 0.50 0 1
Both members are alive and together 0.14 0 1
Female alone, single 0.16 0 1
Female alone, divorced 0.08 0 1
Variables used for the imputation
Occupation of male elderly
Managers and professionals 0.24 0 1
Clerical 0.06 0 1
Sales 0.05 0 1
Craftsmen 0.20 0 1
Operatives 0.12 0 1
Laborers 0.06 0 1
Service 0.05 0 1
Farmers 0.02 0 1
Sample size: 816
All magnitudes are in thousands of 1993 dollarsAppendix Table D3: Wealth Models for Older Adults Without Children (PSID)
Dependent variable: wealth holdings of the household (1,000s of 1993$)
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Yp 4.339 3.135 3.069 2.312 2.37
(1.356) (.946) (.89) (.877) (1.04)
Yp * Yp 0.051 0.050 0.058 0.0574
(.031) (.029) (.032) (0.034)
Yp * (Age - 70) -0.0008 0.054 0.085 0.088 0.089
(.107) (.068) (.057) (.054) (.055)
(Yp * Yp)*(Age - 70) -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0016
     (0.002) (0.002) (.0025)
Yp * (Widowed) 1.365 1.4
(1.923) (2.019)
Yp * (Divorced/Sep) 3.087 3.24
(2.30) (2.51)
Yp * Nonwhite   -0.312
(1.81)
Parents divorced, father remarried 214.82
(283.7)






Age of the oldest member-70 1.65
(4.705)
Age of the oldest member-70 squared -0.399
(.348)
Age of the oldest member -70 cubic -0.003
(.0089)




No mother in 1968 household -41.45
(68.31)
No father in 1968 household -184.71
(58.98)









   (47.818)
Sample size: 327
The permanent income Yp of the household is the deviation from the sample mean (1,000s of 1993 $).Appendix Table D4: Wealth Model Estimates, AHEAD sample of elderly without children
Dependent variable: wealth holdings of a household (1,000s of 1993 $)
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Yp 9.405 9.677 10.104 10.17
(1.210) (1.371) (1.731) (1.792)
Yp * Yp -0.02 -0.021 -0.022
(.014) (.015) (.016)
Yp * (Age - 70) -0.351 -0.38 -0.37 0.142
(.0542) (.091) (.093) (.269)
(Yp * Yp)*(Age - 70) 0.0007 0.001 0.001
(.0004) (.004) (.001)
Yp * (Widowed) -1.51 -1.10
(1.44) (1.44)
Yp * (Divorced/Sep) -0.14 -0.14
(1.85) (1.86)




Control Variables in All Models: (Coefficients displayed for Model IV only.)
age minus 70 35.31
(18.22)
age minus 70 squared -3.02
(2.88)
age minus 70 cubic 0.132
(.189)
age minus 70 quartic -0.002
(.0004)
Parents divorced 16.09
(56.98)
Widower -31.09
(29.33)
Widow -94.36
(25.09)
Nonwhite -30.34
(16.34)
Wave 93 -76.73
(22.22)
Constant 218.65
  (38.80)
Observations: 816